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INTRODUCTION
I think it's a step that had to be taken as we go down the road toward the
full emancipation of women.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun, April 1994, speaking of the reaffirmation
of Roe v. Wade.'
* Assistant Professor, Widener University School ofLaw. J.D. 1990, University of Michigarn BA.
1983, Wesleyan University. I would like to thank Phyllis T. Bookspan, Robert L. Hayman,Jr., and
RobertJustin Lipkin for their extremely challenging and thoughtful comments on earlier drafts
and Christine Mpaka and Tamas Perfit for their invaluable research assistance.
1. Associate Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Remarks at White House News Conference
Announcing His Retirement from the Supreme Court (April 9, 1994) [hereinafter Blackmun
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Since 1973, the Supreme Court has based the right to abortion on
a right to privacy implicit in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.' Despite forceful and increasingly frequent
arguments that the harm caused by restrictive abortion laws deny
equal protection, at least as much as they impinge on personal
privacy,8 the Court has steadfastly refused to consider abortion in this
light.4
The Court's failure to recognize the applicability of equal protec-
tion law stems from its historic refusal to view women and men as
similarly situated with respect to reproductive rights. This is true not
just in the narrow sense that women can become pregnant and men
cannot. Rather, the Court has, in a more fundamental sense, failed
to accord women the respect necessary to make equal protection
claims appropriate. Throughout its abortionjurisprudence, the Court
has treated women as less than full adults and, on that basis, has
denied that women are situated similarly-even if not identically-to
men. The Court's opinions have traditionally reflected the view that
women cannot make decisions about their pregnancy on their own.5
Remarks] quoted in Linda Greenhouse, How a Ruling on Abortion Took on a Life of Its Own, N.Y.
TMEs, Apr. 10, 1994, at E3. Justice Blackmun was speaking about the reaffirmation of Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
2. See Roe 410 U.S. at 153 (holding that Texas' criminal abortion statutes violated
Fourteenth Amendment's "concept of personal liberty" because "the right of privacy... is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision" to terminate her pregnancy).
3. Among the prominent advocates of this view are KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE
POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 92-125 (1984); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE CLASH OFABSOLUTES 105-08
(1990) [hereinafter TRIBE, CLASH OF ABSOLUTES]; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on
Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 378-86 (1985); Kenneth
L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foward: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment.
91 HARv. L REv. 1, 53-59 (1977); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 955, 1016-28 (1984); Donald H. Regan, RewritingRoe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1569, 162 1-
46 (1977). The arguments in favor of equal protection law have been considered so extensively
in these and other works that they will not be explored in detail here.
As a matter of litigation strategy, the American Civil Liberties Union routinely raises the
equality issue in its complaints in abortion cases, but does not develop it during the case because
it is more likely to obtain relief under the privacy doctrine. See RUTH COLKER, PREGNANT MEN:
PRACTIcE, THEORY, AND THE LAw 6 (1994) (describing uses of equality argument primarily in
amieusbriefs in abortion cases); cf. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200-01 (1973) (addressing claims
of wealth-based equal protection violations); Brief forAppellants at 9, 73, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973) (No. 70-18) (noting Roe's indigence and economic hardship resulting from
continuing unwanted pregnancy).
4. Injustices Blackinun and Stevens' separate opinions in Casey, the Court's most recent
major abortion decision, the Justices explicitly recognized that abortion restrictions implicate
equal protection, as well as due process interests. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2846 (Blackmun,J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("A State's restrictions on a woman's right to
terminate her pregnancy also implicate constitutional guarantees of gender equality."); id. at
2838 (Stevens,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Roe is an integral part of a correct
understanding of both the concept of liberty, and the basic equality of men and women.").
5. See, e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 413 (1981) (upholding statute requiring
physicians to notify minor's parents before performing abortion for consenting minor); Belotti
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 649 (1979) (upholding parental consent requirement); Planned Parent-
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Beginning with Roe v. Wade,6 the Court has viewed pregnant women
exclusively as patients and has considered the decision to have an
abortion as purely a medical one-the doctor's medical judgment was
paramount and the woman's concerns were irrelevant unless they
related to her physical health, as defined by the doctor and the
Court.' Later on, the Court viewed the issue from the perspective not
just of the doctor, but of the State, the husband, the parents, the
fetus-everyone but the woman.8  The Court failed to consider the
woman's point of view and she effectively vanished from its opinions.
Until recently, the Court did not recognize the ramifications of
pregnancy and childbirth on women's lives; mothering seemed to fit
so neatly into women's roles that no incompatibility between
motherhood and other aspects of women's lives was imaginable.9
hood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 65-67 (1978) (upholding requirement that doctors provide
women seeking abortions with formulaic information); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 191 (1973)
(requiring women to obtain physician's consent to perform abortion); Roe, 410 U.S. at 164
(holding that abortion decision must be left to medical judgment of physician).
When it comes to life decisions, and particularly decisions relating to reproduction, the Court
has never treated women as complete adults. Laws that constrain women's decisionmaking
processes have been upheld even though the paternalism required tojustify them could never
be applied to men. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 142 (1872) (rejecting
challenge, on privileges and immunities grounds, to Illinois' veto of woman's determination to
practice law and failing to respect woman's own decision). CompareMullerv. Oregon, 208 U.S.
412, 423 (1908) (upholding maximum hours legislation for women in certain professions) with
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64-65 (1905) (striking down, on substantive economic due
process grounds, maximum hours legislation as applied to employees, all of whom were men).
6. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
7. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (holding that in first trimester, physician, rather
than pregnant woman, is free to make determination that patient's pregnancy should be
terminated); see also infra notes 23-93 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's view
of woman as patient).
The Court's view of the ability to control reproduction as unrelated to other aspects of
people's lives, while not unique in the world, seems to be losing ground. Attendees at the
United Nations Conference on Population and Development in Cairo in September 1994 noted
that industrial countries, including the United States, had finally "responded to their warnings
that runaway population growth in the poorest countries will not be slowed until it is considered
as part of a larger problem: poor health care, lack of choice in family planning, abuses and
general powerlessness suffered by millions of women [in the developing world]." Barbara
Crossette, Women's Advocates locking to Cairo, Eager for Gains, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1994, at A3.
The situation of women in the developing world can obviously be distinguished from the
situation of American women. Nonetheless, the worldwide recognition of family planning,
including abortion, as part of largersocial issues is critical to resolving problems faced bywomen
everywhere. This was reaffirmed in the Beijing Declaration, adopted in September 1995 at the
United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, which explicitly recognized and
reaffirmed that "the right of all women to control all aspects of their health, in particular their
own fertility, is basic to their empowerment." United Nations Fourth World Conference on
Women, BeijingDeclaration, September 18,1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current News
File.
8. See infra notes 94-192 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's failure to
consider women's point of view in favor of the perspectives of others).
9. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 492-97 (1974) (holding that employer's decision
to exclude pregnant employees from coverage under employer's disability program did not
violate equal protection); Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961) (discussing women's central
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The Court's most recent effort to clarify the abortion issue was in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,1° where it
upheld some of the nation's most restrictive abortion provisions."
Casey is a remarkably splintered and confusing opinion, despite its
lofty overture that "[l]iberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of
doubt." 2 The lead opinion is so fractured that, as the maze of
concurrences and dissents illustrate," there is something in it for
everyone to hate. Indeed, Casey has received almost nothing but
criticism: pro-lifers have derided its continued protection of abortion,
while pro-choicers have lamented its support of significant abortion
restrictions.14 Furthermore, both advocates and detractors ofjudicial
restraint have reproached the Court for simultaneously reaffirming
and gutting Roe.'5
role in home and family life as justification for exclusion from compulsory jury service). But see
California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987) (stating that women
should be able to have families without fear of losing their jobs under California's pregnancy
disability statute); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 650 (1974) (holding that
rules requiring mandatory maternity leave violate Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause). In his separate opinion in CaseyJustice Blackmun criticized ChiefJustice Rehnquist's
"view of the State's compelling interest in maternal health [as having] less to do with health
than it does with compelling women to be maternal." 112 S. Ct. at 2853 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in judgment in part).
10. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
11. The Court in Casey upheld 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3203 (defining medical emergency);
§ 3205 (imposing informed consent requirement); § 3206 (requiring parental consent); and §
3214 (requiring recordkeeping and reporting). 112 S. Ct. at 2822-26, 2832-33. The Court also
struck down 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3209 (requiring husband notification). Id. at 2830-31.
12. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct 2791, 2803 (1992).
13. Id. at 2802.
14. A brief survey of newspaper articles about Casey demonstrates the confusion it created
and general disapproval it garnered. See, e.g., Dan Allison, How Anti-Abortionists Lost the War, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 16, 1992, at 7D; Another Blow Against Roe, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH,
June 30, 1992, at 2B (editorial); Both Sides See Defeat in Decision, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, July
5, 1992, at 1A Kim Cobb, Both Sides in Abortion Case Claim Defeat, HOUSTON CHRON., June 30,
1992, atAl; B.D. Cohen, Abortion Rights Prevai4 NEwSDAYJuly 14,1992, at 59; BJ. Isaacson-Jones,
Sortingout the Abortion Decision: Women's Rights Remain Threatened, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH,July
5, 1992, at 3B; Frances Kissling, Pro-Choice Must Widen Its Agenda; Reproductive Rights Are in Peri4
Not Just Abortion Rights, LA TIMES, June 30, 1992, at B7; Nancy Myers, What Happens Next in
Abortion Rights Battle? For Opponents of Abortion, Fight to Change the Law Begins Anew, USA TODAY,
June 30, 1992, at 11A, William Neikirk & Glen Elasasser, Ruling Weakens Abortion Right, CHIC.
TRIB., June 30, 1992, at Cl; Reproductive Rights Under Attack, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, July 2,
1992, at 2C (editorial); Alexander C. Sanger, What ictoryfor Abortion?, NEwSDAY, Sept. 5, 1992,
at 41 (letter to editor); David Savage, How Roe v. Wade Survived: Dramatic Shift on Court Ended
Years of War over Abortion, DALLAS MORNING NEwS, Dec. 17, 1992, at 41A, Ellery Schempp, Court
Again Upholds Rights of the Individual N.Y. TIMES,July 17, 1992, atA26 (letter to editor); Kathleen
M. Sullivan, A Victor for Roe; N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1992, at A23; David Tuller, The 2 Sides
Agree-Ruling Settles Nothing, S.F. CHRON., June 30, 1992, at AS.
15. See, eg., Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2860 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part) (observing that "Roe continues to exist but only in the way a storefront
on a western movie set exists: a mere facade to give the illusion of reality"); id. at 2881 (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (noting portions of Roe that did
not survive Casey despite its purported reaffirmation); Alan I. Bigel, Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey: ConstitutionalPrinciples and Political Turbulenc4 18 U. DAYTON
1995] RECONSIDERING ABORTION LAW
Nonetheless, Casey contains the seeds of many positive develop-
ments and could signal the approach of a new phase in the Court's
abortion jurisprudence. Its most significant contribution may be to
broaden the scope of what is considered relevant to the abortion
issue. In several important ways, the lead opinion in Case' 6 seems to
recognize that abortion is much more than a medical decision
affecting people who can only be characterized as patients and
implicating a narrow and precarious privacy interest. 7 Casey considers
the effects of abortion restrictions not just on those in immediate
need of abortion-related services but on all women who assume
control over reproduction in planning their lives.' 8  It also
recognizes that reproductive rights implicate all aspects of women's
social and economic lives and that a state's effort to pigeonhole
women impinges on their right to liberty-not just to privacy. 9
Furthermore, Casey suggests that if such burden is not equally borne
by men, it violates women's rights to equal protection because it
L. REV. 733, 756-62 (1993) (criticizing Casey decision as providing ambiguous standard which
undermined adherence to central holding of Roe); Paul Benjamin Linton, Planned Parenthood
v. Casey: The Flight from Reason in the Supreme Cour 13 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 15,18-34,68-72
(1993) (providing view of attorney for Americans United for Life that Supreme Court's near
total abandonment of Roe undermines Court's rationale that stare decisis requires Roe to be
affirmed); Earl M. Maltz, Abortion, Precedent, and the Constitution: A Comment on Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 11, 19-30 (1992)
(criticizing Supreme Court's decision in Casey to partially adhere to Roe); Julie Schrager, The
Impact of Casey, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1331, 1332-33 (providing views of abortion rights attorney on
Casey's undue burden test); Robin L West, The Nature of the Right to an Abortion: A Commentay
on Professor Brownstein's Analysis ofCasey, 45 HASTINGS LJ. 961,966-67 (1994) (discussing Casey's
fHilure to protect women); Gillian E. Metzger, Note, Unburdening the Undue Burden Standard.
OrientingCasey in ConstitutionalJuisprudence, 94 COLUM. L. REv.2025, 2031-89 (1994) (discussing
Supreme Court's failure to provide useful guidelines for undue burden test and suggesting new
undue burden methodology); Note, Workability of the Undue Burden Test 66 TEMPLE L REv. 1003,
1027-37 (1993) (arguing that Casey's undue burden test violates women's constitutional rights
and proposing return to strict scrutiny analysis for abortion rights as applied in Roe).
16. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter announced the Opinion of the Court and
delivered the Opinion with respect to Parts I, 1, III, V-A, V-C, and VI. This Article refers only
to the parts of the Opinion to which at least five justices have signed on, except where otherwise
noted, and refers to these as the Opinion of the Court for the sake of convenience. Casey is a
rare example of more than one justice signing the Opinion of the Court. See Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153 (1976) (opinion of Court signed byJustices Stevens, Powell, and Stewart); Cooper
v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (opinion of Court signed by all nine Justices).
17. See infra Part III (discussing specific ways in which Casey has broadened traditional
Supreme Court analysis on abortion issue). This Article uses the term "people" rather than the
more specific term "women" in an effort to deter readers from artificially separating women
from people, as if women were somehow different from, rather than half of, the generic
universe of people. This term was embodied in the Beijing Declaration's recognition that
"Women's rights are human rights." United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women,
Beijing Declaration 14, September 18, 1995.
18. See infra notes 247-55 and accompanying text (arguing that Casey recognizes women's
ability to make personal decisions independent of doctors' judgment, thus viewing abortion as
more than medical decision).
19. See infra notes 209-46 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's recognition
of liberty as distinct interest from privacy).
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impedes "the full emancipation of women."20  Thus, the treatment
of the abortion issue in Casey represents an understanding of the
complexity of the issue that was lacking in prior decisions and it is the
first case to evince enough respect for women to warrant application
of equal protection principles. The language in Casey creates the
hope and the promise of a legal doctrine that reflects this more
comprehensive and realistic vision. It is critical to emphasize at the
outset, however, that this promise is not fulfilled in four of the five
holdings of Casey that uphold the restrictions.2
The Court has not granted certiorari in any challenge to abortion
restrictions since it decided Casey more than three years ago and it
appears unlikely that the present Court will revisit the issue in the
immediate future.22 The Court, however, is not likely to stay away
20. Blackmun Remarks, supra note 1.
21. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2822-26, 2832-33 (upholding 24-hour waiting period and one-
parent consent requirements); id. at 2867-69, 2872-73 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2875 (ScaliaJ., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part). The dual nature of Casey-the rhetorical promise for individual
rights and the stunted nature of the holdings-has been recognized since the opinion's
publication. See David A. Strauss, Abortion, Toleration, and Moral Uncertainty, 1992 Sup. Cr. REV.
1, 5 (arguing that theoretical approach implicit in Casey, rather than specific holding, will be
center of debate over abortion issue).
22. For cases applying the undue burden test, see Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d
1452, 1458, 1468 (8th Cir. 1995) (invalidating South Dakota's requirement that physicians notify
minors' parents 48 hours before abortion without judicial bypass but upholding informed
consent and 24-hour waiting period);Jane L v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493, 1505 (10th Cir. 1995)
(invalidating Utah's requirement that doctors performingpost-viability abortions maximize fetus'
chance of survival and prohibition on abortions after 20 weeks); Fargo Women's Health Org.
v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 526, 533 (8th Cir. 1994) (upholding North Dakota's informed consent and
24-hour waiting period which was nearly identical to Pennsylvania's); Utah Women's Clinic, Inc.
v. Leavitt, 844 F. Supp. 1482, 1494 (D. Utah 1994) (upholding Utah's 24-hour waiting period
and informed consent, which was similar to Pennsylvania's); Planned Parenthood v. Neely, 804
F. Supp. 1210, 1218 (D. Ariz. 1992) (invalidating medical emergency exception at too narrow
and parental consent requirement on vagueness grounds). In Mahaffey v. Attorney Gen., No.
94-406793 AZ, 1994 WL 394970 (Mich. Cir. Ct.July 15, 1994), the court invalidated Michigan's
proposed 24-hour waiting period using strict scrutiny as required by state precedent concerning
alleged infringements on fundamental rights.
The Supreme Court has already denied certiorari in several cases applying the undue burden
standard. See, e.g., Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d 1335, 1337-39 (5th Cir.) (upholding two-parent
parental consent with judicial bypass), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 468 (1993); Sojourner T. v.
Edwards, 974 F.2d 27, 29-30 (5th Cir. 1992) (invalidating Louisiana law criminalizing abortions
except in very limited circumstance, such as reported incident of rape or incest if within 13
weeks), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1414 (1993); Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12, 14-15 (5th Cir.)
(upholding Mississippi informed consent and 24-hour waiting period identical to Pennsylvania's,
without evidentiary hearings), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 656 (1992); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan,
The Supreme Court 1991 Ter-Forward: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22,
33, 110 (1992) (noting that "[b]oth sides in the abortion debate decried the joint opinion and
claimed defeat in Casey" and that "[a]ntiabortion activists... competed at press [conferences]
with pro-choice activists... to see whose sound bite could more bitterly excoriate the Court").
For cases decided since Casey, see Barnes, 992 F.2d at 1337 (upholding Mississippi's parental
consent law); Sojourner T., 974 F.2d at 30 (holding unconstitutional Louisiana's prohibition on
pre-viability abortions); Barnes, 970 F.2d at 14-16 (upholding informed consent requirement and
24-hour waiting period "substantially identical" to Pennsylvania's provisions); Preterm Cleveland
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from the abortion cases for long. When it finally does turn its
attention again to abortion, it should rely on the language in Casey to
integrate equal protection analysis into its approach to create a more
sensible abortion jurisprudence for the 1990s and beyond than it was
able to create in the 1970s and 1980s.
Part I of this Article describes the perspective from which the
opinion in Roe v. Wade was written, focusing on the centrality of the
doctor's role in the decision whether or not to end a pregnancy. It
also describes how cases subsequent to Roe amplified the themes
introduced in the landmark decision. Part II describes how, in later
decisions, the Court ignored the woman's interests to such an extent
that she all but disappeared from its vision. In these cases, the Court
evaluated the constitutionality of husband and parental consent or
notification provisions, as well as restrictions on public funding for
abortions. The Court was demonstrably more concerned with
institutions that arguably form the backdrop to American public life,
such as marriage and family, than with the needs of the individual.
Part III describes Caseiys dramatic departure from the earlier cases
and shows how the Court's new understanding of people needing
abortions can lay the groundwork for equal protection arguments in
future cases. Part IV analyzes the mechanics of integrating equal
protection claims into the existing due process framework and shows
how both lines of analysis are necessary and appropriate to a
complete understanding of abortion.
I. THE PATIENT PATIENT
When the Justices first looked at the abortion controversy in 1973,
the person they saw at the center of it was, above all else, a patient.
She was not a complex, multi-faceted human being in a difficult and
unfortunate situation. She was just a patient, incapable of acting on
her own behalf and dependent on the responsible judgment of
another.
23
v. Voinovich, 627 N.E.2d 570, 581 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (upholding informed consent
requirement and 24-hour waiting period similar to Pennsylvania's provisions under Federal and
Ohio Constitutions); In reInitiative Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d 1, 2-3 (Okla. 1992) (striking down
initiative provision prohibiting pre-vability abortions except in narrow circumstances), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1028 (1993). Even if the Court is not tempted to review the constitutionality
of state abortion laws, it may be more interested in reviewing federal prohibitions on abortion.
See, ag., H.R. 1833, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (banning method of late-term abortion without
exception for life or health of pregnant person). The House of Representatives passed H.R.
1833 on November 1, 1995. 141 CONG. REC. 11,618 (1995).
23. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 (holding that, in first trimester, physician, rather than pregnant
person, determines whether pregnancy should be terminated).
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The construction of woman-as-patient is etymologically apt, given
the predominant image of women as passive in our culture.24 A
patient is someone who is "[b] earing or enduring (pain, affliction,
trouble, or evil of any kind) with composure, without discontent or
complaint ... quietly awaiting the course or issue of events."25  It
derives from the Latin "pati," meaning to suffer.2 As a philosoph-
ical matter, patience has "two component parts[:] the submission
which accepts the will of God and the waiting which rests upon both
faith and hope."2 7
24. See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 142-50 (1982) (describing women's
culturally adopted views of themselves as passive); KATE MILLETr, SEXUAL POLITICS 31 (1970)
(describing passivity as main female "virtue" in our culture); DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND
GENDER 20-24 (1989) (documenting women's exclusion from professions as justified by their
"delicate organization, emotional instability, and domestic obligations" which required "a bovine
placidity during critical reproductive years" in order to avoid "brain-womb conflict"); WOMEN'S
STUDIES ENCYCLOPEDIA 136-39 (Helen Tierney ed., 1991) (explaining that"masculinity-femininity
tests" of 20th century viewed femininity as being tied to passiveness, emotions, lack of
independence, and personal relationships, whereas masculinity was tied to assertiveness,
independence, rationality, and interest in objects); Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches
to International Lam, 85 Am. J. INT'L L. 613, 626 (1991) (describing "western liberal version" of
"normal" behavior for women as reactive and passive).
Several writers have looked at the association between femaleness and passivity in particular
contexts. See, e.g., Michele Bograd, What are Feminist Perspectives on Wife Abuse, in WOMEN'S
STUDIES: ESSENTIAL READINGS 197 (SteviJackson ed., 1993) (discussing wife battering and its
effect on female passivity); ROBIN TOLMACH LAKOFF, LANGUAGE AND WOMEN'S PLACE 14-19
(1975) (discussing women's propensity to phrase affirmative statements as questions to avoid
being considered assertive and therefore unfeminine); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED 74 (1987) (discussing conflict between being successful lawyer and successful "lady"
who is more deferential). Seegenerally NAOMI WOLF, FIRE WITH FIRE (1993) (discussing women's
ambivalence toward gaining and using power).
In addition, the image of female passivity pervades virtually every aspect of our legal system,
which simultaneously and contradictorily assumes women's inability to protect themselves and
their contentment with their situations. The old laws of coverture, work regulations, see Muller
v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 423 (1908) (upholding Oregon statute limiting number of hours
women could work), and statutory rape laws that punish only the male, see Michael M. v.
Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464,475 (1981) (deferring to state's interest in preventing illegitimate
teenage pregnancy), are examples of the law's paternalism, while the failure to punish marital
rape and domestic violence exemplify law's assumption that women choose their situations. The
Court's decision in Rosther v. Goldberg straddles both categories. 453 U.S. 57, 83 (1984)
(upholding women's exciusion from military registration).
Another indication of the pervasiveness of the image of women as passive is the backlash
against that stereotype by feminists. See generally BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN? (1981)
(discussing history of black women and feminism and reactions to black feminism).
25. XI THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICFIONARY 342-43 (2d ed. 1989).
26. Id. at 342; see also Reprimand by Chief Judge Miles Lord to Executives of A.H. Robins
in the Dalkon Shield litigation,filed injudicial Council Proceedings 203, In reComplaint of A.H.
Robins, No. JCP 84-001 (8th Cir. Jud. Council 1984) (suggesting that different consequences
would have flowed had A.H. Robins' "victims" of Dalkon Shield "been men rather than women,
women who seem through some strange quirk of our society's mores to be expected to suffer
pain, shame and humiliation"), cited in KAREN M. HICKS, SURVIVING THE DALKON SHIELD:
WOMEN V. THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 19-20 (1994).
27. 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION AND ETHICS 674-75 (James Hastings ed., 1955) (using
female pronoun to describe patience as Christian virtue).
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If people seeking abortions are just patients, their lights are
appropriately circumscribed by the role of the attending physician."
The medical judgment of the physician limits the right to abortion
itself, as defined by Roe. Given that abortion is a medical procedure,
the physician's role in the effectuation of the procedure is clearly not
objectionable. What is striking, however, is the degree to which Roe
constitutionalized the physician's role in the decisionmaking pro-
cess-a process that will usually entail more non-medical than medical
components.29
Even at the earliest stage, when the woman's interest is compelling
and the State's is not, the Court says that "the abortion decision and
its effectuation" are left to the doctor's medical judgment. 0 Thus,
with non-therapeutic abortions (the kind at issue in Roe), the
physician decides in the first instance whether or not the election
should be made. Under Roe, the physician is not only invited to
28. The widely held view thatJustice Blackmun wrote his opinion in Roe from the point of
view of physicians has been attributed to his decade as general counsel for the Mayo Clinic
which ostensibly gave him "a unique [among his brethren] appreciation of the problems and
strengths of the medical profession" and prompted him to "sympathize[] with the doctor who
was interrupted in his medical practice by the state, and told how he could or could not treat
his patients." BOB WOODWARD & SCOT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 167, 174 (1979). But see
Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574, 1626-29 (1987) (expressing
skepticism aboutJustice Blackmun's Mayo Clinic experience as underlying physician perspective
in Roe). The difference between Henderson's view and the hypothesis of the male authors of
The Brethren could be attributed to the latters' failure to recognize the male viewpoint as
distinctive viewpoint.
More generally, Roe illustrates the difficulty people have in thinking from a perspective other
than their own. Or, as Professor Martha Minow has said, "Wherever you stand, there you see."
Martha Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for Social Change, 52 U. PITT. L.
REv. 723, 723 (1991). Thus, it should not surprise us that the nine men on the Supreme Court
saw abortion from the point of view of men, not women. SeeJohn Hart Ely, The Wages of Ciying
Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YA.E LJ. 920, 934 n.85 ("Of course mostjudges, like most
legislators, are white males, and there is no particular reason to suppose they are immune to the
conscious or unconscious temptations that inhere in we-they generalizations."); ef. Mar J.
Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom. Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L REV.
323, 324 (1987) (urging scholars, and presumably courts, to adopt perspective of "those who
have felt the falsity of the liberal promise"); Patricia Williams, The Obliging Shelk An Informal
Essay on Formal Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2128, 2137-51 (1989) (providing analogous
critique of City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), as having been written
from white perspective). The "we-they" dichotomy is particularly jarring with respect to
pregnancy, which is distinctly difficult to imagine without experiencing it because it has no
analogue in the experience of men. See COLKER, supra note 3, at 4-5 (commenting on how
being pregnant affected her theoretical views of abortion issue). Unlike males, most females
either have already experienced pregnancy or assume that at some point they may become
pregnant.
29. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 (holding that in first trimester, physician, rather than pregnant
person, makes determination that pregnancy should be aborted).
30. Id. at 164; see also Andrea Asaro, The Judicial Portrayal of the Physician in Abortion and
Sterilization Decisions: The Use and Abuse of Medical Discretion, 6 HARv. WOMEN'S LJ. 51, 51-88
(1983) (arguing that Supreme Court possesses inordinate respect for physician in abortion
cases).
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participate at this stage, he3l is constitutionally required to lead the
decisionmaking process.3 2 This contrasts with other kinds of elective
surgery where, by definition, the patient herself elects the procedure
or not. Substitute vasectomy (or any other elective procedure) for
abortion and the absurdity of the doctor's veto power becomes
clear." In fact, no Court opinion on abortion has considered the
situation from the patient's point of view; by contrast, the Court has
examined the physician's situation exhaustively.'M
Placing the physician in the decisionmaking process has several
jurisprudential ramifications. First, it reduces the woman to nothing
more than a patient, merely the object of the physician's medical
judgment. Second, it reduces the decision to nothing more than a
medical one, rendering all other characteristics irrelevant. Stripping
the woman and the decision of all their attributes but the medical
one, denies the woman her humanity and the decision its complexity.
As a pragmatic matter, without her humanity, she cannot claim equal
protection of the laws because she is not fully a person; she is but the
object of someone else's professional judgment.
Presumably, the Supreme Court in Roe thought that requiring
physicians to play a prominent role from the time the abortion
31. The cases habitually refer to the doctor as a man. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 515 (1989) (requiring physician to apply his reasonable skill and
judgment); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
767 (1986) (requiring physician to report basis for his determination that fetus is not viable);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 61 (1976) (referring to physician and hispatient);
Roe, 410 U.S. at 138 (permitting physician to terminate pregnancy "[w] here he is of the good
faith opinion" that abortion is necessary) (emphasis added). But see Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2824 (1992) (referring to physician as him or her); id. at 2843 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (referring to physician as female).
In 1973, fewer than 10% of doctors were women. See Henderson, supra note 28, at 1628
(citing STATISTICAL ABSTRAGT OF THE UNITED STATES 1975, at 75 (noting that because medical
profession was predominantly male in 1973, doctors "were full-fledged human beings whose
'rights' merited protection from prosecution")). The American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (AGOG), whose membership comprises mostly board-certified practicing
obstetricians, reports that in 1995, roughly one-third of its members are female. Telephone
Interview with Sophia Ware, Membership Coordinator, AGOG Resource Center (Sept. 29, 1995)
(reporting total membership of 35,710 obstetricians of whom 9822 are female).
32. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 (holding that doctor has discretion to determine whether
pregnancy should be terminated).
33. A man's right to have a vasectomy is limited by his ability to find a doctor to perform
it, but he is not required to consult with the doctor as to whether or not it is a good idea.
Although there are plain differences between a vasectomy and an abortion, those differences
are not obviously relevant to the doctor's role, but to other factors. In other words, there is no
inherent or constitutional reason why the existence of a fetus or the emotional trauma that may
attend abortion requires the commanding presence of a doctor at the decisionmaking stage.
34. The issue is not whether the right to abortion is absolute or balanced against some
asserted state interests. Rather, the issue is the Court's attitude while it balances. The Court's
condescension toward and marginalization of women prevents it from acknowledging the scope
and extent of women's interests.
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decision is first considered would make abortions somewhat more
difficult to obtain. Physicians historically have been among the most
active proponents of abortion restrictions.35 If the concern were
solely to ensure a thoughtful decision that would be in the woman's
best interest, the Court could have selected other alternatives, such as
trusting the woman to know what is best for herself or perhaps
requiring her to discuss her situation with her best friend. Entrusting
the physician with primary decisionmaking authority, although likely
to reduce the incidence of abortion, is not necessarily likely to further
the woman's best interests.
In Roe, the Court did recognize that unwanted pregnancy may result
in ajobian litany of ills unrelated to a person's medical condition.36
For instance, the Court said:
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a
distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent.
Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is
also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted
child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family
already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In
35. See Motion and Brief Amicus Curiae of Certain Physicians, Professors and Fellows of the
American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology in Support of Appellees at 9, Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-18) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (No. 70-40) (describing
viability of human offspring in early stages of gestation); see also Brief of 281 American Historians
as Amid Curiae Supporting Appellees at 13, Websterv. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 290
(1989) (No. 85-605) [hereinafter Brief of 281 Historians] (documenting medical profession's
opposition to readily available abortion, though not primarily on moral grounds). "Without
exception, physicians were the principal nineteenth-century proponents of laws to restrict
abortions.... [S] ome doctors had moral objections to abortion, as well as moral and social
views about women and race. But the most significant explanation for the drive by medical
doctors for statutes regulating abortion is the fact that these doctors were undergoing the
historical process of professionalization." Id.; see also SARAH RAGLE WEDDINGTON, A QUESTION
OF CHOICE 40 (1992) (noting that medical profession "wanted to put out of business the
midwives and homeopathic physicians who often did abortions"). Professor Sylvia Law has
explained: "The 1830s saw a blossoming of a popular health movement, dominated by women
practitioners, particularly directed to women's health problems, and emphasizing education,
nutrition, and self-reliance.... [The regular allopathic medical profession sought these
restrictive laws to promote the authority of regular doctors and to restrict their irregular
competitors." Law, supra note 3, at 1014 n.218 (citations omitted). As a result of the political
and medical genesis of American abortion laws, physicians have, since the professionalization
of medicine, played prominent roles in the determination of whether or not a woman is entitled
to an abortion. For instance, the life or health of the mother-a medical factor-is often the
only exception to abortion prohibitions. Samuel W. Buell, Note, Criminal Abortion Rvsited, 66
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1774, 1784 (1991) ("The typical early abortion statute punished the provision of
abortifacients... unless necessary to preserve the woman's life. . . ."). Even then, however, it
is the doctor's obligation in the first place to determine what constituted a danger to life or
health-terms fraught with ambiguity and vagueness, but well within the physician's discretion.
Ironically, physicians have also paid for their control over the abortion decision by carrying
primary or exclusive civil or criminal liability under most nineteenth century abortion statutes.
See infra notes 51, 60 and accompanying text (discussing historical liability of physicians under
abortion statutes).
36. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
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other cases ... the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of
unwed motherhood may be involved."
Although the Court should be credited for recognizing these non-
medical issues, it undercut the potential benefit of this recognition by
concluding that all these issues must be left to the attending physician
to decide.' Because of this reliance on the physician, the myriad
and varied factors implicated in a woman's decision to abort fuse into
a singular medical factor, like a machine churning out widgets
regardless of what is put into it. In Doe v. Bolton, 9 the companion
case to Roe, the Court held that "the medical judgment may be
exercised in the light of all factors-physical, emotional, psychological,
familial, and the woman's age-relevant to the well-being of the patient. All
these factors may relate to health. This allows the attending physician
the room he needs to make his best medical judgment."" This
conclusion credits the physician, whose only required training is
medical, with understanding the social, psychological, economic, and
reputational ramifications of abortion better than the person suffering
through an unwanted pregnancy. Despite the personal nature of the
decision, the Court designates the physician-not the pregnant
woman-as the indispensible and responsible party, without whom the
decision cannot be made, let alone effectuated.4' Roe conjures up
the image of the pregnant woman, patiently lying on an examining
table, feet in stirrups, waiting for the man in the white coat to
exercise his medical judgment.42
37. Id.
38. Id at 164. The harm, of course, is not the extent to which doctors do, in fact, veto
women's requests for abortion but the fact that they have the opportunity to do so and that the
woman is not constitutionally permitted to decide on her own whether or not it is in her best
interest to have an abortion.
39. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
40. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973) (emphasis added). Although the Court cited
this passage with approval in H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 404-05 (1981), it ended that
opinion with the observation that the State may constitutionally burden the decision to abort
more than the decision not to because "[i]f the pregnant girl elects to carry her child to term,
the medical decisions to be made entail few-perhaps none-of the potentially grave emotional
and psychological consequences of the decision to abort." Id. at 412-13 (emphasis in original).
When applied to abortions, the term "medical" is expansively defined tojustify the participation
of the physician in all aspects of the decision, but these factors are apparently not implicated
in childbirth, a result that might surprise most people who have given birth. This is not to
suggest that the physician's participation ought to be required in the aftermath of childbirth,
but merely that the Court's definition of medical, for the purposes of physician authority, is
malleable.
41. The implication of the Court's formulation could be that the woman is not responsible
because if she were, she would not have gotten herself into this mess.
42. At oral argument in Roe, Sarah Weddington, Roe's counsel, tried unsuccessfully to focus
the Court's attention, especially during rebuttal, on the people who were most dependent on
the Court's finding of a constitutional right for abortion. Henderson, supra note 28, at 1625
(citing 75 LANDMARK BRiEFs AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
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Thus, in the first trimester of pregnancy-when "the abortion
decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of
the pregnant woman's attending physician"I'--the physician and his
patient, in that order, are the key players. In the second trimester,
however, the State emerges as an additional player, with its own
agenda." Now, the State may regulate the abortions "in ways that
are reasonably related to maternal health."'  Because the State's
only cognizable interest at this point is in the health of the woman,
the image of the woman-as-patient intensifies; she is now not only in
her physician's care but in the State's care as' well. The State's
conception of the woman's welfare supercedes both the physician's
and her own. The woman may need the abortion and her doctor
may concur, but, in the second trimester, the State can veto it in the
name of maternal health. In this unusual area, the State may override
a doctor-patient consensus purportedly to further the health of the
patient.46 In almost every other context, it would be presumed that
the adult patient could be entrusted with the non-medical issues and
the physician with the medical ones, leaving no role for the State to
play.
At the final stage of pregnancy, the State may narrow the scope of
medical discretion and require the doctor to think only of preserving
the life or health of the woman. "[T]he State in promoting its
interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate,
and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropri-
ate medicaljudgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother."' The State may now close the door on any interest the
woman or her physician might have previously had in the non-medical
aspects of pregnancy. In this stage, the State's interest in the
potentiality of human life completely eclipses the person who faces a
distressed future, who suffers imminent psychological harm, whose
mental and physical health are taxed by child care, and who is
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 832-33 (Philip Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT]). It is also true that Weddington
began her arguments by focusing on the physicians' difficult situations under the law. See 75
LANDMARK BRimS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra, at 783.
43. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
44. Id
45. Id
46. See i. (discussing how State may intrude into doctor-patient relationship by regulating
abortion procedure after first trimester). Other contexts in which this could occur include
doctor-assisted suicide and therapies involving experimental drugs, but in neither of these is
there an underlying constitutional right to choose the procedure.
47. I. at 164-65.
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stigmatized by being an unwed mother. All that remains is the
patient patient.
In Doe v. Bolton, the Court further obscured the non-medical aspects
of pregnancy when it rejected the plaintiffs' argument that requiring
someone to get the approval of a hospital committee for an abortion
gave the committee excessive discretion which it might not exercise
in the patient's best interest.' The Court said that the plaintiffs'
suggestion
is necessarily somewhat degrading to the conscientious physician,
particularly the obstetrician, whose professional activity is concerned
with the physical and mental welfare, the woes, the emotions, and
the concern of his female patients. He, perhaps more than anyone
else, is knowledgeable in this area of patient care, and he is aware
of human frailty, so-called "error" and needs. The good physician
... will have sympathy and understanding for the pregnant
patient ....
The Georgia statute at issue in Doe required the concurrence of six
physicians before a woman could have an abortion." The Court
held that only one was necessary to approve an abortion, striking
down the two-physician concurrence requirement and the three-
physician committee approval requirement.5 The Court did this,
however, not because of any individual right to privacy, but because
of a "physician's right to practice.""2 The majority did not even
mention the privacy right. OnlyJustice Douglas, who had developed
the privacy right eight years earlier in Griswold v. Connecticut,3 raised
it in his concurrence." Thus, it has been clear since these first cases
were decided that the Court has been more sympathetic to claims that
a statutory provision impinges on a physician's discretion than that it
violates a woman's privacy.
Subsequent cases perpetuate the image of woman-as-patient and
reinforce the physician's central role "in consulting with the woman
about whether or not to have an abortion, and in determining how
48. Doe 410 U.S. at 197. The Court ultimately struck down the committee requirement
because it was superfluous to the physician's approval that was already required. See id. at 197-
98.
49. Id. at 197.
50. Id. at 199.
51. IL (noting that no other voluntary medical procedure requires second opinion).
52. Id.
53. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Griswold is generally credited with establishing the constitutional
right to personal privacy, at least in the area of procreation. Id. at 484-86.
54. Doe, 410 U.S. at 209-21 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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any abortion [is] to be carried out" 55 Throughout these cases, the
woman and her physician are considered to be unequal partners in
decisions relating to abortion. For instance, in Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,56 the Court asserted that "[a]
woman and her physician will necessarily be more reluctant to choose
an abortion" if the State permits the decision to become public.57
Lower courts and other higher court cases tip the balance in the
physician's favor, requiring the woman to make this decision "'in
consultation with her physician and in reliance on his judgment,'"58
even if the abortion has already been deemed medically necessary.
In some instances, the statutes themselves all but guarantee that
the woman's own interests will be marginalized and viewed only in
medical terms.59 They reinforce the paradigm established in Roe that
values the physician's judgment over that of the pregnant person.
Specifically, most laws describe abortion as a procedure performed on
a woman, rather than as an exercise of a constitutional right, making
the woman the passive recipient of the procedure and the object of
the physician's activity, rather than the agent making it happen. 0
The legislative designation of viability, accepted by the Court for
the first time in Casey, is another way states have kept women from
controlling their own pregnancies by ensuring women's dependence
on medical professionals to plan abortions. Common law and early
statutory law did not regulate abortions until quickening, when "the
55. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387 (1979) (striking down as overly vague statute
forbidding abortion when fetus "may be viable"); see alsoAkron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health,
462 U.S. 416, 427, 447 (1983) (Akron I) (limiting restrictions which can be placed on second
trimester abortions); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 65-67 (1976) (finding
requirement of woman's written consent not overbroad and not unconstitutional).
56. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
57. Thomburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 766
(1986).
58. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 305-06 (1980) (emphasis added) (quoting McRae v.
Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 737 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)).
59. See infra note 60 (discussing various statutory schemes criminalizing abortion).
60. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-140 (1992) ("A person commits the offense of criminal
abortion when he administers any medicine, drugs, or other substance whatever to any
woman."); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6703 (1992) ("No person shall perform or induce an abortion
when the fetus is viable."); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 112, § 12L (1995) ("If a pregnancy has existed for
less than twenty-four weeks no abortion may be performed except by a physician and only if, in
the best medical judgment of a physician, the abortion is necessary under all attendant
circumstances."); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-6901 (Supp. 1994) (defining abortion as "an act,
procedure, device, or prescription administered to a woman... and administered with the
intent and result of producing the premature expulsion, removal, or termination of the human
life within the womb of the pregnant woman"); OKLA. STAT. dt. 63, § 1-730 (1995) (defining
abortion as "the purposeful termination of a human pregnancy by any person," including
pregnant woman herself); Wo. STAT. § 35-6-101 (1994) (defining abortion as "an act,
procedure, device or prescription administered to or prescribed for a pregnant woman by any
person with knowledge of the pregnancy, including pregnant woman herself').
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woman perceived signs of independent life."6' Roe adopted the
trimester framework which was more objective than quickening, yet
still capable of being assessed by the woman herself (given that
trimesters are counted in twelve-week increments beginning from
conception or from the date of the woman's last menstrual peri-
od).6 Under either of these standards, no additional medical
information was needed to plan the termination of a pregnancy and
the pregnant person could control the decision herself.
With legislative and judicial acceptance of the viability standard, the
critical information rests with medical professionals and not with the
pregnant people.63 As the Court explained in Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth,' "[W]e recognized in Roe that viability was a matter of
medical judgment, skill, and technical ability, and we preserved the
flexibility of the term" for the medical profession.' Even the
plaintiffs in Danforth agreed that the determination of viability rests
with the physician in the exercise of his professional judgment.66 In
61. Brief of 281 Historians, supra note 35, at 5 (emphasis in original); see also CARROLL
SMITH-ROSENBERG, DISORDERLY CONDUCt: VISIONS OF GENDER IN VICTORIANAMERICA 219 (1985)
(quoting Blackstone as saying that life "'begins in contemplation of law as soon as an infant is
able to stir in the mother's womb,'" and noting that until the 1860s, "'abortion during the first
four months of pregnancy (before quickening...) that did not involve the mother's death was
not an indictable offense in the United States'") (citing I WILULAM BLACSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*125-26).
62. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164 (discussing trimester framework).
63. Viability is defined as "that stage of human development when the fetus is potentially
able to live outside of the mother's womb with or without the aid of artificial life support
systems." S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-10 (Law. Co-op 1985); see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 160-63
(indicating that viability is when fetus can live outside womb with life support). In Roe, the
Court found viability significant because it signaled the point at which the State's interest in
protecting fetal life may become compelling. See id at 163; accord Webster v. Reproductive
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490,519 (1989) (arguing against arbitrary line of viability as being point
where State's interest may begin).
The viability of any particular fetus is difficult to determine and can only be ascertained by
estimating the fetus's gestational age, weight, and lung capacity. Webster, 492 U.S. at 515. The
Court in Webster upheld a provision that essentially presumed the viability of a 20-week fetus, id.
at 516, although the Court in Roe stated that viability "is usually placed" at about seven months
or 28 weeks, but may occur earlier. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160. Several states have adopted viability
as the determinant for permissible abortions. See, eg., ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010(d) (1994)
("'[Albortion' means an operation or procedure to terminate the pregnancy of a nonviable
fetus."); IND. CODE § 16-34-2-4(b) (1993) ("An abortion may be performed after a fetus is viable
only if there is in attendance a physician, other than the physician performing the abortion.");
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6703 (Supp. 1994) ("No... abortion when the fetus is viable un-
less... referral from another physician."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-302(3) (1974) (placing
restrictions on abortions after "20 weeks gestational age").
64. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
65. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 64 (1976); see also Colautti v. Franklin,
439 U.S. 379,388 (explaining that "[v]iability is reached when, in thejudgment of the attending
physician on the particular facts of the case before him, there is a reasonable likelihood of the
fetus' sustained survival outside the womb, with or without artificial support"); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3203 (1983) (adopting Colautt's language in definition of viability).
66. Danfortl 428 U.S. at 65 nA (citing Appellees' Brief).
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his dissent in Thornburgh, Justice White objected to the viability
standard as being "contingent on the state of medical practice and
technology, factors that are in essence morally and constitutionally
irrelevant."67
Nonetheless, the Court in Casey asserted that its rejection of Roe's
trimester framework and adoption of the viability test was insignificant
because it went "only to the scheme of time limits."6 But the shift
actually undermines control over one's pregnancy and reinforces the
physician's role in the abortion decision. Without knowing the state
of technology at her hospital and medical information about the
fetus' development, a woman cannot plan to terminate her own
pregnancy.69 This standard reinforces the woman's dependence on
her physicians and her own status as a passive patient rather than a
self-reliant adult in control of her own situation.
The informed written consent requirement is another legislative
tool that has the effect of neglecting women's interests. Upholding
such a provision, the Court in Danforth irrebuttably presumed that a
woman cannot make a personal and important decision absent a
physician's impersonal and formulaic recital.7" The Court failed to
realize that subjecting a woman to an informed consent requirement
insults her intelligence because it presumes that she will not identify
67. Thomburgh v. American College of Obstetricians &'Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 795
(1986) (White,J., dissenting). Justice White's objections to the viability standard are legitimate
and independent of the objections raised here:
'The governmental interest at issue is in protecting those who will be citizens if their
lives are not ended in the womb. The substantiality of this interest is in no way
dependent on the probability that the fetus may be capable of surviving outside the
womb at any given point in its development, as the possibility of fetal survival is
contingent on the state of medical practice and technology, factors that are in essence
morally and constitutionally irrelevant. The State's interest is in the fetus as an entity
in itself, and the character of this entity does not change at the point of viability under
conventional medical wisdom. Accordingly, the State's interest, if compelling after
viability, is equally compelling before viability.
I& at 795 (White, J., dissenting).
68. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2811 (1992).
69. As Justice Scalia noted in his opinion in Casey, the fact that a machine could keep a
baby alive at a given gestational age does not mean that such a machine is available to all
infants. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2897 n.5 (ScaliaJ., dissenting in part). ChiefJustice Rehnquist,
in his opinion in Casey, however, suggested that the viability determination was taken over by the
Court, rather than by doctors or states. See id. at 2858 (Rehnquist, CJ., concuning in part and
dissenting in part). Under either of these formulations, people not carrying a child decide for
people who are carrying a child whether they should continue to do so. As a practical matter,
the viability framework may benefit women because viability should occur no sooner than 23 or
24 weeks, whereas quickening can occur at 16 or 18 weeks. Accord Webster v. Reproductive
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490,519 (1989) (arguing against arbitrary use of viability as being point
where State's interest may begin). See generally SMIH-ROSENBERG, supra note 61 (defining
quickening).
70. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67 (requiring written statement by woman demonstrating that
she understood her physician's input).
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or consider all the important issues on her own. It subverts her
independence because it is not tailored to her particular situation.
And it undermines her self-confidence by forcing her to second-guess
herself when she may already be in a vulnerable position.7'
The Court in Danforth did note that the only other patients whose
informed consent is required are patients "committed to the Missouri
State chest hospital ... or to mental or correctional institutions."
7 2
The informed consent requirement might be justified by the legal
fiction that pregnant women, like people committed to mental or
correctional institutions, need some kind of formalized protection to
fend off over-reaching doctors who might otherwise take advantage of
them.73 Although it is certainly possible that some people benefit
from the State's vigilance, it is not at all clear that this problem is
pervasive enough tojustify an irrebuttable presumption. Alternatively,
it might not be justified at all, but simply "rest on outmoded and
unacceptable assumptions about the decisionmaking capacity of
women ... [as being] less capable of deciding matters of gravity."7 4
Given the primacy of autonomy and respect for the individual that
defines our legal culture, it is ironic that, in this one area that affects
primarily women, laws irrebuttably presume an inability to act
autonomously.75
71. See id. at 65-67.
72. Id. at 66 n.6 (citations omitted). Because of the breadth of information that must be
conveyed, the informed consent at issue in the abortion context is entirely different from the
routine consent form one signs prior to any non-emergency surgery which merely states what
procedure is to be performed and some of the most common risks associated with the surgery.
SeeBerkey v. Anderson, 1 Cal. App. 3d 790, 803-04 (1969) (describing physician's duty to explain
medical procedure in order to obtain patient's informed consent). It is worth noting that
consent is a curious term to use in the context of making the decision to end a pregnancy and
securing someone to do it. Absent unusual circumstances, one no more "consents" to an
abortion than one consents to having one's hair cut. Rather, one decides that abortion is
necessary and seeks a professional to effectuate that decision.
73. See W.L. Atee & DA. O'Donnell, Report of the Committee bm Ciminal Abortion, 22
TRANSACTIONS OF AM. MED. ASS'N 239, 241 (1871) (presenting American Medical Association's
description of women who seek abortions as being weak and vuinerable).
74. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2842 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(discussing mandatory delay aspect of informed consent requirement).
75. Autonomy has been a central concern of both modem and contemporary philosophers.
See genera/y BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); RONALD
DWORIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (W.
Hastie trans., Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 1974); JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF
GOVERNMENT IN Two TREATISES OF GOVERNmENT (Peter Laslett ed., 1950);JOHN STUART MILL,
On Liberty, in 25 THE HARvARD CLASSICS 193 (Charles W. Eliot ed., 1909) (1859);JOHN RAWLS,
A THEORY OFJUSTICE (1971). The Critical Legal Studies movement has also addressed this
tradition. See Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn
Selves, 62 TEX. L REV. 1563, 1569-70 (1984) (criticizing reification of individual rights as
alienating). For a feminist critique of autonomy as a dominant value of legal liberalism
including critical theory, see generally Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv.
1 (1988) (explaining how liberal legal theory's focus on individualism and autonomy reflects an
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The limits that do exist on informed consent are defined not by the
woman's constitutional right nor by her personal needs, but again by
the physician's broad discretion. The State can only require that the
doctor tell the woman 'just what would be done and ... its conse-
quences."76 Any more specific information would be problematic, not
because of its coercive effects on women, but because it "might well
confine the attending physician in an undesired and uncomfortable
straighjacket in the practice of his profession.""
The Court in Danforth, acknowledged:
The decision to abort, indeed, is an important, and often stressful
one, and it is desirable and imperative that it be made with full
knowledge of its nature and consequences. The woman is the one
primarily concerned, and her awareness of the decision and its
significance may be assured, constitutionally, by the State to the
extent of requiring her prior written consent'
By defining just what kind of informed consent is required, the State,
with the Court's approval, defines how stressful or important the
decision may be; paradoxically, the more stressful for the woman, the
more the State's interference is justified.
The Court's opinion in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health
(Akron iJ),7 adopted the same vision of the doctor/patient relation-
ship, although it struck down Akron's informed consent provision for
two reasons."0 First, the fact that the regulation was designed to
"persuade [the woman] to withhold" her consent, rather than merely
to inform it, rendered the provision unconstitutional; a state may
significantly intrude on a woman's discretion but it may not coerce
her to forego exercising her rights.81  Second, the regulation
intruded on the physician's discretion by requiring the physician to
"recite [a formula] to each woman regardless of whether in his
judgment the information is relevant to her personal decision." 2
The combination of these two premises means that, despite the fact
that abortion laws ostensibly implicate a woman's privacy right, the
woman's discretion is restricted by the doctor's medical judgment
while the doctor's discretion is protected against interference by the
essentially male perspective). I am particularly indebted to RobertJustin Lipkin for drawing my
attention to the irony of abortion restrictions' disregard for women, given the predominance
of autonomy in our legal culture.
76. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8 (1976).
77. Id. at 67 n.8.
78. M at 53.
79. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
80. Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 444-45 (1983) (Akron I).
81. Id. at 444.
82. It. at 445.
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State. 3 But absent coercion of the pregnant person or intrusion
into the discretion of the physician, "a State may require that a
physician make certain that his patient understands the physical and
emotional implications of having an abortion."84 The physician thus
becomes the judge of what physical and emotional considerations are
relevant to the woman's: personal decision and the decision can only
be implemented once he avers that she has considered what he has
deemed the appropriate factors. Thus, his discretion goes not only
to whether she continues the pregnancy or not but even to whether
she has adequately considered the question. He may require her
decision to meet whatever procedural obstacles he thinks appropriate
in order to satisfy himself that she has maturely considered her
options. 5 Clearly, the scheme described here clashes with the
American constitutional ideal that values autonomy and individualism
above all else.86
Moreover, the State's interest in abortion is not limited to the
medical aspects of the procedure. Indeed, it is not at all clear why
the physician is the appropriate spokesperson to communicate this
information, especially because so much of the information may be
non-medical in nature. Nonetheless, it is always "the physician and
his patient mak[ing] that decision,"" with the State looking on-but
not so closely as to make the doctor uncomfortable.
Even more troublesome than the informed consent provisions are
the requirements that women notify or seek the consent of their
husbands. In Danforth, the Court struck downsuch a restriction, but
only because it violated the State's limited authority to delegate veto
power,88 not because it was wholly inconsistent with a view of women
as competent, autonomous, responsible adults. The Court held that
"since the State cannot regulate or proscribe abortion during the first
stage, when the physician and his patient make that decision, the
State cannot delegate authority to any particular person, even the
83. "[W]omen's right to decide [to have an abortion] has become merged with an
overwhelmingly male professional's right not to have his judgment second-guessed by the
government...." Kristen Booth Glen, Abortion in the Courts: A Lay Woman's Historical Guide to
the NewDisasterArea, 4 FEMINIST STUDIES 1, 7 (1978), cited in CATHARINEA. MACKINNON, TOWARD
A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 189 (1989) [hereinafter MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST
THEORY].
84. Akron I, 462 U.S. at 445.
85. See id.
86. See supra note 75 (indicating that autonomy has been central concern of both modern
and contemporary philosophers).
87. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976).
88. See id. at 70.
RECONSIDERING ABORTION LAW
spouse, to prevent abortion during that same period."89  The
decision is made jointly by the physician and his patient. The only
question is the degree to which the husband controls the exercise of
medical discretion, just as the question with informed consent
provisions is the degree to which the State controls it. Again the
answer is that the woman's right is protected not by constitutional
privacy but by the broad shield of physician discretion which protects
doctors and, through them, their patients from excessive oversight by
other parties.
In striking down the informed consent provision, the Court
recognized that a veto must rest with either the wife or the husband
if they disagree, and that because "it is the woman who physically
bears the child and who is the more directly and immediately affected
by the pregnancy, as between the two, the balance weighs in her
favor."9" Thus, the woman's greater interest does not, in and of
itself, preclude another's veto of her decision, but merely militates for
her where the power to delegate is brought into question. It seems
apparent that, in a world where women's experience was understood
and valued, her greater interest in her pregnancy would not need to
be litigated in the highest court; it would be so obvious as to be
subject to judicial notice.9 Delegation of the veto power to the
physician, however, was not as problematic for the Court. In a
footnote, the Court alluded to the woman's interest in self-determina-
tion, but it persisted in its view that even the most personal of
interests should be shared with a stranger.92 "The State, accordingly,
has granted [the husband] the right to prevent unilaterally, and for
whatever reason, the effectuation of his wife's and her physician's
decision to terminate her pregnancy."93 The decision is so impor-
tant to the woman that she cannot be compelled to share it with her
husband, although she can be compelled to share it with a physician.
Despite the woman's incommensurably greater burden in deciding
89. 1& at 69.
90. 14 at 71.
91. A fact may be judicially noticed if it is "not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is
either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of
accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned." FED. R. EVID. 201(b). In her oral argument during Rom Sarah Weddington spoke
as if the significance of pregnancy is properly subject to judicial notice, although the Courtwas
not particularly receptive. She saih "I think it's without question that pregnancy to a woman
can completely disrupt her life." Transcript of Oral Argument, in 75 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND
ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 42, at 787-88, cited in Henderson, supra note 28,
at 1623.
92. Danfodth, 42.8 U.S. at 70 n.11.
93. Id. (emphasis added).
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whether to abort or carry a pregnancy to term, the cases perpetuate
the view that the decision, and not just its implementation, is only a
medical one, appropriately shared with a physician exercising medical
judgment.
II. THE PHANTOM
In several abortion decisions, the Court has omitted almost all
mention of the pregnant person; she does not even appear in the
one-dimensional role of the patient. The Court addresses the
concerns of many interested parties, including the physician, the
State, the fetus, the husband, and the parents, but effectively ignores
the living people who are most affected by its authority. In these
decisions, the woman is a phantom without substance, lurking
voicelessly in the shadows, unable to assert her own interests.
Given the importance of legal abortions to women,9 4 it is striking
that what has been called the "woman question"95 has been persis-
tently overlooked in cases not about property or trusts but about
women. Asking the woman question would require the Court to
consider how its decisions affect women. The woman question
"demands ... special attention to ... interests and concerns that
otherwise may be, and historically have been, overlooked."9 6 The
Court's failure to address women's experience in its abortion opinions
reveals the extent to which it has studiously ignored the implications
of its decisions on women.
97
94. See Law, supra note 3, at 980 (noting that "[n] othing the Supreme Court has ever done
has been more concretely important for women" than finding constitutional protection for
abortion).
95. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. REV. 829, 837 (1990)
(discussing need to ask "the woman question"). Bartlett traces the roots of the woman question
to Simone de Beauvoir, although the term reaches back at least to the 19th century debate
about the changing status of women in American society. See id. at 837 n.3103 (citing SIMONE
DE BEAtVOIR, THE SECOND SEx at xxvi (1957)); see also Grant Allen, Plain Words on the Woman
Question, POPULAR SCI. MONTHLY (Dec. 1889), reprinted in MEN'S IDEAS/WOMEN'S REALITIES
POPULAR SCIENCE, 1870-1915, at 125-31 (Louise Michele Newman ed., 1985) (referring to
"Woman-Question agitators" and arguing that women's "emancipation must not be of a sort that
interferes in any way with the prime natural necessity" of bearing four or five children).
96. Bartlett, supra note 95, at 846.
97. A possible exception to this is Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). In Bollon, the Court
allotted a paragraph to a description of Mary Doe's complex and difficult life. Id. at 185. At
age 22, Doe had two children in foster homes because she was indigent and unable to care for
them, and her third child had been placed up for adoption. Id. When her husband abandoned
her, Doe lived with her indigent parents and their eight children. Id. In addition, she had a
history of mental illness, would not be able to care for the child she was carrying at the time of
the suit, and was told that abortion would be less dangerous to her health than childbirth. hL
The scant attention paid to Mary Doe shows how even the most troubled lives barely move the
Court to consider the costs of abortion restrictions on women. Justice Douglas in concurrence,
however, recognized in more detail than any otherJustice in any other abortion case, including
Caey, the variety of burdens borne by someone who is compelled to carry a pregnancy to term.
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Perhaps one reason for this judicial inattention is that the sanctions
in abortion statutes have historically been directed at people other
than the pregnant person.98 The earliest American abortion
regulations were enacted when abortions were more dangerous than
childbirth and any surgery was potentially lethal.9 Because these
restrictions were passed to protect women's health, they did not
punish the women seeking the abortion. I" ° For instance, the 1857
Texas statute at issue in Roe prohibited a doctor from performing an
abortion despite the pregnant woman's consent, doubled the penalty
if the doctor did not have the woman's consent, and in its definition
of abortion, included not only the destruction of the fetus in the
womb, but the causing of premature birth. 1 ' The harm, therefore,
was in putting the woman at greater risk than she would otherwise
face. Furthermore, civil prohibitions against abortions generally
provided that the physician violating the law be responsible for
damages to the injured party whether it was the woman, her husband,
or her parents.0 2 Women have been generally exempted from both
criminal and civil liability.10 3
Id. at 214-16 (Douglas, J., concurring).
98. See Buell, supra note 35, at 1785. The early American abortion statutes in most states
"did not address the issue [of the woman's culpability] explicitly, choosing instead to leave her
out of the crime, at least as a matter of statutory law... Ultimately, the legislatures of fifteen
states declared that a woman who solicited or submitted to an abortion had committed a
criminal act" but subjected her to a lesser penalty than that applicable to the person performing
the abortion. Id. "However, no reported cases reflect the actual enforcement of these
provisions against women." id. The bill recently passed by the House of Representatives to ban
certain late-term abortions continues this trend. See H.R. 1833, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
The bill permits that "[t]he father, and if the mother has not attained 18 years at the time of
the abortion, the maternal grandparents of the fetus" may obtain appropriate relief from the
doctor. Id. § 1531 (c) (1). The woman "upon whom a partial birth abortion is performed" is
immune from prosecution as a principal or for a conspiracy. Id. § 1531(d).
99. Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 429 n.11 (1983) (Akron I)
(explaining that Roe "identified the end of the first trimester as the compelling point because
until that time-according to the medical literature available in 1973--'mortality in abortion
may be less than mortality in normal childbirth'" (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 163)); see also Brief
of 281 Historians, supra note 35, at 12 ("[U]ntil the twentieth century, abortion, particularly
when done through surgical intervention, remained significantly more dangerous to the woman
than childbirth.").
100. See Brief of 281 Historians, supra note 35, at 12 (discussing sanctions against doctors
who perform abortions); see also H.R. 1833, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 141 CONG. REC.
11,618 (1995) (banning partial-birth abortions).
101. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1191-1194, 1196 (West 1911), cited in Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 118 (1973).
102. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3209(e) (Supp. 1995) (granting civil cause of action
against physician who performs abortion without private consultation and informed consent);
see also H.R. 1833, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., § 1531(c) (1), reprinted in 141 CONG. REc. 11,618 (1995)
(enabling father and, if mother has not attained age of 18 years, maternal grandparents, of
fetus, to obtain appropriate relief against doctor performing abortion).
103. See H.R. 1833, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., § 1531(d), reprinted in 141 CONG. REG. 11,618
(1995) (providing that woman on whom partial-birth abortion is performed may not be
prosecuted).
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The post-Roe spate of abortion restrictions have again diverted
attention from the woman and continue to reinforce judicial
disregard for women's interests, although for different reasons. Given
that early abortion is now safer than childbirth, most modem laws are
enacted for purposes other than maternal health and tend to protect
the interests of the fetus but not those of the pregnant individual.0 4
For example, Missouri's abortion law begins with a series of legislative
findings establishing, among other things, that "(1) [t] he life of each
human being begins at conception; (2) [u]nborn children have
protectable interests in life, health, and well-being; (3) [t] he natural
parents of unborn children have protectable interests in the life,
health, and well-being of their unborn children."0" This amounts
to three different ways of saying that a law regulating a woman's
reproduction is about the significance of the offspring's interests and
the insignificance of woman's interests, despite constitutional
protection for the latter. Although abortion is as much about women
making life decisions as anything else, many participants in the
abortion debate seem oblivious to the woman's perspective.
The failure to comprehend the woman's perspective has similarly
marred the enforcement of abortion laws. Laws imposing civil or
criminal penalties on parties involved in abortions have consistently
treated the women seeking them as victims, not as perpetrators. And
yet, "a primary impediment to the enforcement of abortion statutes
was probably the fact that the woman, as the potential complainant,
104. See, eg., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.710 (Michie 1994) ("The general assembly of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky hereby finds and declares.... [t] hat it is in the best interest of
the people of the Commonwealth of Kentucky that every precaution be taken to insure the
protection of every viable unborn child being aborted, and every precaution be taken to provide
life-supportive procedures to insure the unborn child its continued life after its abortion."); RI.
GEN. LAws § 23-4.8.1 (1982) ("The purpose of this chapter [relating to spousal notice for
abortion] is to promote the state's interest in furthering the integrity of the institutions of
marriage and the family."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-301.1 (1994) ("It is the intent of the
Legislature to protect and guarantee to unborn children their inherent and inalienable right
to life . . ." but that "a woman's liberty interest... may outweigh the unborn child's right to
protection ... when the abortion is necessary to save the pregnant woman's life.. . ."). The
Illinois statute states:
[Tihe longstanding policy of this state to protect the right to life of the unborn child
from conception by prohibiting abortion unless necessary to preserve the life of the
mother is impermissible only because of the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court and that, therefore, if those decisions of the United States Supreme Court are
ever reversed or modified or the United States Constitution is amended to allow
protection of the unborn then the former policy of this state to prohibit abortions
unless necessary for the preservation of the mother's life shall be restated.
ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 510/1 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
105. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.205 (Vernon Supp. 1995), cited in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 504 n.4 (1989).
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did not consider herself a victim of a crime." °6  Women who
obtained abortions were rarely prosecuted and had little motivation
to obtain the conviction of their doctors. 07
For the past twenty years, litigation strategists challenging abortion
restrictions have followed the leads of legislators, judges, and
prosecutors by focusing on the role of doctors rather than that of
women. Before 1973, women figured prominently in abortion
litigation. Often, the cases were brought on behalf of hundreds or
even thousands of women as individual plaintiffs, and on occasion,
women were permitted to testify about the significance of abortion to
them."8 In other cases, however, claims by women were dismissed
for lack of standing whereas claims by doctors were adjudicated, and
often sustained on privacy and other grounds.0 9 Doe resolved this
split, but did so against women's interests. The Court in Doe
conclusively held that physicians have standing to challenge abortion
statutes, even if they have not been prosecuted or even threatened
with prosecution: "The physician is the one against whom these
criminal statutes directly operate in the event he procures an abortion
that does not meet the statutory exceptions and conditions."110
Since Doe, doctors and other health care providers, rather than
pregnant women, have been the principal litigants.
For example, the plaintiffs in Webster v. Reproductive Health Servic-
es"' were "five health professionals employed by the State and two
nonprofit corporations""2 who sued for themselves, as well as other
health professionals and physicians." 3 The plaintiffs also said they
represented the class of pregnant women seeking abortion assistance
in Missouri."4 In this case, no pregnant woman sued individually;
106. Buell, supra note 35, at 1789-90 (citing Michael S. Sands, The Therapeutic Abortion Act, 13
UCLA L. REV. 285, 291 (1966)).
107. SeeBuell, supra note 35, at 1790 (noting that "[w omen who procured abortions virtually
were immune from prosecution, and no reported case deals with a woman convicted of
procuring abortion" (citing OTTO POLLAK, THE CPaMINAIUY OF WOMEN 45 (1950))); TRIBE,
CLASH OF ABSOLuTEs, supra note 3, at 122; Cyril C. Means, Jr., The Law of New York Concerning
Abortion and the Status of the Foetus 1664-1968: A Case of (Cessation) of Constitutionality, 14 N.Y.LF.
411, 492 (1968); Harvey L. Ziff, Recent Abortion Law Reforms (Or Much Ado About Nothing), 60 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 17 (1969); Note, A Functional Study of Existing Abortion Laws, 35
COLUM. L. REv. 87, 90-91 (1935)).
108. See Law, supra note 3, at 972 (citing Abele v. Markle, 452 F.2d 1121 (2d Cir. 1971)).
109. CompareAbramowitzv. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048,1056-58 (D.NJ. 1972) (dismissing case
filed on behalf of 1200 women for lack of standing) with Young Women's Christian Ass'n v.
Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048, 1055 (D.NJ. 1972) (holding that organizations and physicians could
"litigate the alleged deprivations of the constitutional rights of their women patients").
110. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973).
111. 429 U.S. 490 (1989).
112. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 501 (1989).
113. ld. at 502.
114. Id.
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSnIY LAW REVIEw [Vol. 45:77
the individual plaintiffs were a nurse, a social worker, and three physi-
cians."' In Danforth, the plaintiffs were medical care providers who
brought suit on behalf of themselves and other physicians who
perform abortions within Missouri." 6 They also purported to
represent "the entire class consisting of... patients desiring" to end
their pregnancy; the patients were not before the Court on their own
behalf."7  Similarly, in Akron , the plaintiffs were "three corpora-
tions that operate abortion clinics in Akron and a physician who has
performed abortions.""" In these cases, women do not appear
before the Court as individuals with personal, cognizable injuries; they
appear only to the extent that doctors choose to represent them.
This implies that abortion restrictions harm doctors primarily and
women only incidentally, if at all.
This can lead to the curious result that a physician plaintiff, who is
subject to criminal sanctions, can raise claims on behalf of patients
that an individual could not raise on her own behalf. For instance,
in H.L. v. Matheson,119 a minor could not argue that the statute was
unconstitutional as applied to mature minors "since she had not
alleged that she or any member of her class was mature or emancipat-
ed."'20  By contrast, the physician plaintiff in Akron I could raise
claims on behalf of both his mature and immature minor pa-
tients.12 1
Given these sets of plaintiffs, it is not surprising that the Court has
difficulty understanding the concerns of the pregnant women.
Nonetheless, the relationship between the medical professionals who
act as plaintiffs before the Court and the Court that fixates on the
interests of medical professionals is mutually reinforcing. Because the
women most affected by these laws are not present in the courtroom,
there is no opportunity for their stories to be heard, for arguments
about their particular situations to be made, or for the facts of their
lives to be admitted as evidence.
22
115. I&
116. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1976).
117. Id. at 57.
118. Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 425 (1983) (Akron I).
119. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
120. Akron , 462 U.S. at 440-41 n.30 (referring to H.L v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 406
(1981)).
121. Id
122. See Thornburgh v. American College ofObstetricians &Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,752
(1985) (suggesting that because plaintiffs included clergymen as well as health care providers,
religious community has as much interest in woman's pregnancy as woman herself). The
presence of a pregnant plaintiff before the Court, however, does not appear to change the
results or the Court's analysis. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 303 (1980) (describing named
plaintiff in abortion funding case as "New York Medicaid recipient" wishing to terminate
102
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The Court's intentional or unintentional ignorance of the woman
question has resulted in the elimination of women's presence in its
opinions. But this attitude has done something else as well. In many
of its opinions, the Court has subordinated women to abstract ideas
and institutions whose values apparently take precedence over
women's own values. These institutions-of which marriage and
family are the primary examples-engulfs the pregnant woman's real
experience because the Court consistently views them in idealized
abstraction.
A. The Institution of Marriage
When the law requires a woman to obtain her husband's consent
before she has an abortion, it suggests that she is taking something of
his away from him." The fetus is his property (though in her
custody) and she needs his concurrence before she disposes of it.124
In considering these laws, the Court has supplanted the woman with
an outmoded vision of the institution of marriage."
pregnancy); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 467 (1977) (characterizing plaintiffs in abortion
funding case as "two indigent women ... unable to obtain physician's certificate of medical
necessity"). Efforts to bring women's stories to the Court are laudable, though the Court's
opinions have not, for the most part, reflected these efforts. See Brief for the Amid Curiae
Women Who Had Abortions and Friends of Amid Curiae In Support of Appellees, Webster v.
Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605) (containing stories of 2887 women
and 627 "friends" of Court). The Thornburgh opinion may come closest to recognizing these
stories. See Thomburgh, 476 U.S. at 763 (stating that state statutes may require health care
providers to share information that is "out of step with the needs of the particular woman").
See generally COLKER, supra note 3, at 6-7 (discussing bringing reality of abortion restrictions to
attention of courts).
123. This type of requirement is known as "spousal consent." Despite its common gender-
neutral name, however, there is nothing gender-neutral about it in the abortion context because
its only possible effect is to require a woman to get the consent of a man. See Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2826-32 (1992) (discussing ramifications of husband
notification requirements as compared to parental consent provisions). As Casey makes clear,
these types of requirements are harmful whether they require consent or notification. This
discussion applies equally to both.
124, Such consent requirements treat the wife's pregnancy like an asset of community
property, for which the managing spouse is responsible for giving "prior written notice to the
other" of any disposition of the property and requiring each spouse to "act with respect to the
other spouse in the management and control of the community assets and liabilities in
accordance with the general rules governing fiduciary relationships." CAL FAM. CODE § 1100(e)
(West 1994).
125. The practice of subordinating women to the institution of marriage has a long history.
Under the common law, women lost their legal identity when they married. See NORMA BASCH,
IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE AND PROPERiY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK
(1982), excerpted in KATHARINE BARTLETT, GENDER AND THE LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE,
COMMENTARY 4-5 (1993) (explaining that wives assumed their husbands' name and social status
and came under husbands' protective cover in condition called coverture). A woman under
coverture lost notjust her legal identity but authority over every aspect of her life, including sex
and reproduction. Though coverture seems archaic, it remained in effect in many jurisdictions
well into this century. See United States v.Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 342 (1966) (describing coverture
as quaint and wife as "benefidary" of it). See generally Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971)
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Although the Court in Danforth ultimately struck down the
requirement that the husband consent, it did so because the State
lacked the power to delegate the veto over first-trimester abor-
tions 26 The Court warmly endorsed the State's concern about the
impact of the abortion decision on the institution of marriage,
regardless of its actual impact on the woman within that institu-
tion.127 The Court reassured its readers that it had not "failed to
appreciate the importance of the marital relationship in our society.
Moreover, [it] recognize [d] that the decision whether to undergo or
to forego an abortion may have profound effects on the future of any
marriage, effects that are both physical and mental, and possibly
deleterious."12 The Court attends to the ramifications of unwanted
pregnancy on the abstract institution, but does not comment on the
effects on the woman, effects that are indeed likely to be physical,
mental, and deleterious.1" The Court seems unconcerned with
these effects, though they will inevitably affect the marriage relation-
ship. Although, in Roe, the Court at least identified the deleterious
effects of abortion (chosen or foregone) on the woman," three
years later in Danforth, the Court only recognized the potential
deleterious effects on the marriage.' The Danforth opinion, like
others, is written entirely from the perspective of the man-in this
case, the husband, whose concern is with his marriage and his
family-and not from the perspective of the woman, whose concern
is with her body and her life, as well as with her marriage and her
family.
The Court elaborated on this theme, noting that it was "not
unaware of the deep and proper concern and interest that a devoted
and protective husband has in his wife's pregnancy and in the growth
(depriving wife of driver's license because coverture makes car community property and
personal property may be disposed of only by husband). Thus, it is not surprising that a legal
regime that disables a wife from acting on her own behalf and permits a husband to rape her
also seeks to grant him the right to control any consequences of sex he has with her. See State
v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38, 4547 (N.J. 1981) (discussing marital exemption to criminal law of rape);
People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 573, 577-78 (N.Y. 1984) (invalidating state's marital rape
exception on equal protection grounds), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1020 (1985).
126. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1975). Catharine MacKinnon
described this situation as a "remarkable if subliminal admission that male power by men in the
family is coextensive with state power." MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY, supra note
83, at 193.
127. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 69-70.
128. Id. at 70 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2871 (1992) (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (adopting "importance of the marital relationship" language).
129. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 69-70.
130. SeeRoe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159-64 (1973) (discussing effects of abortion on women).
131. Danfortl, 428 U.S. at 69-71.
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and development of the fetus she is carrying." 2 Furthermore,
"[r]eference is made to an abortion's possible effect on the woman's
childbearing potentia"13  The husband's concern-codified by the
State and endorsed by the Court's language (though not its hold-
ing)--is not with the person he married, but with her pregnancy, her
fetus, her future childbearing potential. This certainly accords with
the law's historic stance that women's primary importance lay with
their reproductive capacity and that any individual woman's interests
may justifiably be subordinated for the government's view of the
common good.13
The implication of husband notification and consent laws, however,
is notjust that the woman's primary role is to reproduce, but that she
cannot be trusted to fulfill this role on her own. Rather, the
husband's oversight is necessary to safeguard her childbearing
function. She would selfishly choose the abortion, ignoring implica-
tions for marriage and childbearing potential, whereas he would
prevent the abortion to save the family and the marriage. The State
is betting that the husband is less likely than the wife to agree to an
abortion (otherwise a husband's concurrence would not constitute
much of a safeguard). Her interests are not cognizable to the Court
while his are paramount. If he consents, then it must truly be
necessary and in everyone's best interest. The woman has disap-
peared, lost in a web of marriage and childbearing potential.
B. The Integrity of the Family
Husband consent and notification requirements generally have
been struck down, nominally because of the state's lack of power to
delegate, but more realistically because of the recognition that they
impermissibly treat women like children and not like men."5
132. Id. at 69 (emphasis added); see Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2831 (commenting, albeit somewhat
sarcastically, on "husband's interest in his wife's reproductive organs").
133. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 68 (emphasis added).
134. See, e.g., Moorehead v. New York, 298 U.S. 587, 629 (1936) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting)
("The distinctive nature and function of women-their particular relation to the social
welfare-has put them in a separate class."); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908)
(upholding maximum hours legislation for women because "as healthy mothers are essential to
vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of woman becomes an object of public interest and
care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race"); see also Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S.
57, 62 (1961) ("[W]om[e]n [are] still regarded as the center of home and family life. We
cannot say that it is constitutionally impermissible for a State, acting in pursuit of the general
welfare, to conclude that a woman should be relieved from the civic duty ofjury service unless
she herself determines that such service is consistent with her own special responsibilities."),
overred in part by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
135. In Casey, however, the Court suggested, but did not hold, that husband notification and
consent laws violate the constitutional right to equal protection based on gender. See Casey, 112
S. Ct. at 2804-05; see infra text accompanying notes 285-94.
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Parental consent laws, by contrast, are constitutional because they
permissibly treat minors or children (albeit pregnant children) like
children. I" In these cases, the analysis is similar to that in the
husband consent cases,"37 but here the institution of family and
parental authority rather than the institution of marriage supplant the
unmarried minor.
In parental consent cases, the Court has focused primarily on the
rights of the adult-parents-the putative grandparents-to raise a
child, marginalizing the right of the pregnant girl not to raise a
child.ss In Bellotti v. Baird,l"9 the Court considered at length the
traditional reasons for treating children differently from adults under
the Constitution, which is silent on the subject."4 Ironically, it
concluded that the adult-parents deserve almost the full bundle of
privacy rights available, leaving virtually nothing to the minor."'
The Court found that "the tradition of parental authority is [one of
136. See Bellotti v. Baird, 433 U.S. 622, 642-43, 653-56 (1979) (discussing distinct
constitutional status of minors and adults); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74 (invalidating, on delegation
grounds, statutes that permit parental veto of minor's decision to abort, absent some judicial
bypass). Thirty-two states currently require unemancipated minors to notify or obtain the
consent of a parent or someone who stands in loco parentis. See ALA. CODE § 26-21-3 (1994);
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2152 (1995); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25958 (West 1995);
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-101 (West 1995); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790 (1994); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 390.001 (West 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-112 (Michie 1995); IDAHO CODE §
394301 (1994); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 420, para. 515/4 (1995); IND. CODE § 16-18-2-267 (1995); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.732 (Baldwin 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1299.35.5 (West 1995); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1597-A (West 1994); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-103 (1995);
MASS. GEN. L ch. 112, § 12s (1995); MicH. COMP. LAWs § 722.903 (1995); MIss. CODE ANN. §
4141-51 (1994); Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.028 (1994); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-6903 (1994); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 30-5-3 (Michie 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03 (1995); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. §
2919.12 (Anderson 1994); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3206 (1995); LI. GEN. LAWs § 23-4.7-6 (1994);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-31 (Law. Co-op. 1993); S.D. CODIFED LAWs ANN. § 34-23A-7 (1995);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-10-303 (1995); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 35.03 (West 1995); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-7-304 (1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-76 (Michie 1995); Wis. STAT. § 48.375 (1994);
Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-118 (1995). In most states, the age of majority for such purposes is 18,
although some states lower it. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-600(2) (1992) (defining majority at
age 16); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-10(m) (Law. Co-op. 1990) (defining minor as female under
age of 17 for purposes of abortion). States define emancipation variously. See, e.g., KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 311.732 (1) (b) (Baldwin 1995) (exempting minors who are or have been married
or who are deemed emancipated by court order); Wis. STAT. § 48.375(z) (e) (1994) (exempting
minors who are not in their parents' care, who are or have been married or who have previously
given birth); Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-101 (a) (x) (1995) (exempting minors who are legally married,
in active military service, or have lived away from their parents and been financially independent
for at least six months).
137. See supra notes 123-34 and accompanying text (discussing marriage analysis of husband
consent provisions).
138. SeeBellott4 443 U.S. at 648 (articulating parents' interests in normal family relationship);
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75 (weighing independent interests of parents against interests of minor
daughter).
139. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
140. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633-39 (1979).
141. See id. at 637-39 (stating that guiding role of parents justifies limitations on freedoms
of minors).
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the basic presuppositions of] our tradition of individual liberty," that
is, the liberty of the individual parent, not the minor.142 Parental
authority apparently does not begin with the decision whether or not
to become a parent.
The Court has repeatedly recognized that "the relationship between
parent and child is constitutionally protected."" In the context of
parental consent laws, however, the constitutional protection operates
only in one direction: to protect the parent's discretion, but not that
of the minor.1" In H.L. v. Matheson, the Court held that a parental
consent provision "plainly serves the important considerations of
family integrity and protecting adolescents."" Indeed, the Court
has noted that legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive
of the parental role, may be important to the child's chances for full
growth and maturity, thereby using the guarantee of individual liberty
to justify restrictions on such liberty, particularly restrictions delegat-
ing the minor's discretion to the parents. 4'
The Court's treatment of these regulations reveals its propensity to
consider cases independently of the real-life situations out of which
they arise and to subordinate reality to formalistic analysis. In H.L.
v. Matheson, for instance, the Court failed to imagine what might
happen in real life when a girl tells her parents, under compulsion of
law, that she is pregnant and needs an abortion. 47 The Court's
hypothesized world is without emotion and without pain or violence.
It has repeatedly failed to acknowledge the trauma that compulsory
disclosure to parents is likely to cause and, instead, focuses on the
utilitarian function of disclosure for what it deems to be significant
state interests. Disclosure to parents, the Court has found, is useful
because it permits parents to "provide medical and psychological data,
refer the physician to other sources of medical history, such as family
142. Id at 638.
143. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 410 (1981) (citing Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246,
255 (1978) (upholding Georgia statute permitting adoption without unwed father's consent)).
144. Nonetheless, in some of the cases the Court cited for this proposition, the State's
authority to control the exercise of the child's discretion is so broad that it may override even
the parent's discretion if inconsistent with state policy. SeePrince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
170-71 (1944) (upholding parent's conviction for permitting child to work selling religious
literature on street in violation of state labor laws, despite daughter's own desire to do so), cited
in, Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 636 n.14 (1979). The Court in Bellotti explained that society's
interests in protecting the welfare of children and giving them a chance for personal growth
justified State enforcement of the Prince statute. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 636 n.14 (citing Prince,
321 U.S. at 165).
145. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 411.
146. See Bellott4 443 U.S. at 638 (stating that tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent
with our tradition of individual liberty).
147. See Matheson, 450 U.S. at 413 (finding that inhibiting some minors from seeking
abortions does not justify voiding statute).
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physicians, and authorize family physicians to give relevant data."148
Except in the most cursory fashion, the Court refuses to put itself in
the place of a pregnant high school student or drop-out; 49 rather,
it speaks from the point of view of a parent, focusing on the
importance of the family institution in America and the constitutional
rights of parents over minors.
As with the husband consent law considered in CaseI °  parental
consent law primarily affects only those families in which relations are
so strained and sometimes violent that the pregnant minor would not
on her own seek the advice and support of her parents. By defini-
tion, the law is only relevant where a girl has made the determination
that she is better off not telling her parents. The law then seeks to
override that judgment.
The Court has upheld regulations requiring a minor to obtain the
consent of a parent where judicial bypass or some other "alternative
procedure" is available."' This safeguard supplements the basic Roe
148. Id. at 411. Although most states have waiver provisions, such waivers tend to operate
in a narrow range of cases. All states permit waiver when the abortion is required as a medical
emergency to save the life of the minor and when the person to be notified is deemed
unavailable. Some states that require consent from both parents permit the minor to obtain
consent of only the mother if the pregnancy resulted from sex with the father. SeeALA. CODE
§ 26-21-3(b) (1987); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 720, para. 520/7(b) (1995); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-
53(2)(c) (1994); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3206(a) (1995); Wis. STAT. § 48.375(4)(b)(2) (1994).
Some states waive the requirement altogether where the minor is a victim of certifiable child
abuse or neglect SeeARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-805(3) (Michie 1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 34-23A-7(3) (1995). Wisconsin also waives the requirement when a psychiatrist certifies that
the minor's well-being requires waiver or that the minor is likely to commit suicide rather than
seek parental consent. See Wis. STAT. § 48.375(4) (b)(1m) (1994).
149. In BellottI4 the Court briefly listed some of the burdens borne by pregnant minors, but
refused to conclude that the strong presumption that these girls were in dire circumstances
required particular compassion for their situation. 433 U.S. at 642 (acknowledging potentially
severe problems facing pregnant minors). Instead the Court nonchalantly suggested that
abortion alternatives such as marriage to the child's father, placing the child up for adoption,
or becoming a mother with her family's support, may be reasonable and in the minor's best
interests. See id. at 642-43. This assumes that the girl would not consider these alternatives on
her own and that the alternatives would palliate the difficulties of pregnancy. It further ignores
the inconsistency created by a legal scheme that encourages childbirth that results from what
many states call statutory rape. Ruth Colker has suggested that heightened scrutiny is
appropriate for pregnancy-reated legislation that concerns adolescents because this group bears
all the indicia of a suspect classification. See Ruth Colker, An Equal Protection Analysis of United
States Reproductive Health Polity: Gender, Race, Age, and Class, 1991 DUKE LJ. 324, 359-63
[hereinafter Colker, An Equal Protection Analysis].
150. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2827-29 (1992) (describing troubling
picture of physical violence relating to abortion).
151. See Bellotti, 433 U.S. at 643 (concluding that State lacks constitutional power to grant
third party total veto over minor's abortion); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74
(1976) (holding that State does not have constitutional authority to give third party absolute and
potentially arbitrary veto). Judicial bypass to a consent provision would appear to mock the
premise that abortion is protected as a privacy interest. If the decision is so private that parents
may not interfere with it, it defies understanding why a state court judge should be able to, or
how ajudge could determine what is in the girl's best interest. See infra notes 156, 159, 160, 161,
162 (citing reported judicial bypass cases). To determine how mature a minor is, courts have
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requirement that the pregnant woman consult with her physician by
additionally requiring her to consult with her parents or a court.152
It completes the plan envisioned by many state legislatures of
imposing on every person who seeks an abortion the additional
burden of obtaining consent from another person (usually male): an
unmarried girl needs permission from her doctor and her parents or
a judge, a married girl or woman needs permission from her doctor
and her husband, and an unmarried woman needs permission from
her doctor.15 1 Everyone has to get the approval of at least one
stranger for this most intimate of private decisions.
For the judge, the question in these cases is whether the minor is
mature enough to have an abortion.M Virtually no attention,
however, is paid to the maturity required to cope with unwanted
pregnancy regardless of outcome or to decide not to have an
abortion-that is, the maturity required for one young person to raise
another or to give up an infant for adoption.'55 Only through
legalistic abstractions severed from real world context could a court
find that a pregnant girl is sufficiently mature to raise a child or give
it up but not sufficiently mature to have an abortion. 5 6
felt free to ask extremely personal questions concerning the girl's sexual experience. See H.B.
v. Wilkinson, 639 F. Supp. 952, 955 (D. Utah 1986) (questioning why minor did not use birth-
control); Ex parte Anonymous, 618 So. 2d 722, 723 (Ala. 1993) (inquiring into frequency of
sexual activity); In re Anonymous, 655 So. 2d 1052, 1053 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995) (considering
evidence of minor's relationship with her boyfriend and whether she was currently sexually
active); In reT.P., 475 N.E.2d 312,313-14 (Ind. 1985) (inquiring about minor's prior abortion).
In Bellot4Justice Stevens noted that "[i]t is inherent in the right to make the abortion decision
that the right may be exercised without public scrutiny and in defiance of the contrary opinion
of the sovereign or other third parties." 443 U.S. at 655 (Stevens,J., concurring). Privacy does
not mean very much if it does not even protect a girl from the scrutiny of ajudge of her sexual
experiences. See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 219 (1973) (Douglas,J, concurring) (arguing
that privacy right becomes illusory when State mandates physician approval system for
abortions).
152. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2832 (reaffirming courts' discretion to authorize or deny abortion
for minors).
153. See supra notes 123-34, 139-48 and accompanying text.
154. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2832 (providing that court must make necessary determinations
of whether young woman is mature and capable of giving informed consent, and whether
abortion is in her best interest).
155. The Court has said that "[t]here is no logical relationship between the capacity to
become pregnant and the capacity for a mature judgment concerning the wisdom of an
abortion." H.L v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 408 (1981).
156. In some instances, this may oversimplify the issue. Courts that deny a minor's petition
for waiver of the parental notification or consent requirement may believe not that the minor
should not obtain the abortion but that, in the long run, parental involvement in the decision
is truly in her best interest. See, e.g., In reAnonymous, 597 So. 2d 709, 710-11 (Ala. Civ. App.
1992) (affirming trial court's finding that abortion without parental consultation was not in best
interest of 14-year old girl who sought waiver but had not spoken to any adult other than her
lawyer about her abortion). What happens to these girls after the courts deny their petitions
is certainly an important line of inquiry, but is beyond the scope of this Article.
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Belotti requires judicial bypass of the parental consent requirement
if the girl is able to show either:
(1) that she is mature enough and well enough informed to make
her abortion decision, in consultation with her physician, indepen-
dently of her parents' wishes; or (2) that even if she is not able to
make this decision independently, the desired abortion would be
in her best interests. 57
The juvenile court or other governmental agency empowered to
authorize minors' abortions must do so if the minor satisfies her
burden."t This accommodation may sound acceptable, but it is
difficult to envision its implementation. It is not clear, for instance,
what criteria should apply to measure someone's maturity or to
determine what is in another person's best interest. Courts tend to
ask questions in three general areas. First, courts ask what the girl's
life is like at present: how are her grades in school? what extracurric-
ular activities is she involved in? does she work outside school?
Second, courts inquire about the scope of her knowledge about the
procedure itself: does she know what the risks are? does she have
contingency plans in case of complications? And, third, courts
inquire about her plans for the future: Does she plan to go to
college? to get married?59 The degree to which the trial court
should ask about the girl's family life is unclear." °
The problem is exacerbated by many people's strong views about
abortion. A judge who believes abortion is morally indefensible is
157. Belotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979).
158. Id. at 647-48.
159. Many of the reported cases on parental consent are from Alabama. See, e.g., In re
Anonymous, 650 So. 2d 919, 921 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994) (affirming denial of waiver, where trial
court considered the minor's deportment, her failure to contact medical professionals or any
adult, inadequate post-operative plans considering that minor did not obtain any information);
In reAnonymous, 650 So. 2d 923, 924 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994) (reversing denial of waiver for lack
of maturity where minor held after-school job, had serious future plans of going to college and
getting married, seemed to understand what was involved in abortion, and had considered
alternatives).
160. SeeExparteAnonymous, 618 So. 2d 722, 724-25 (Ala. 1993) (reversing denial of waiver,
noting that the anticipated reaction of the parents is of little consequence in assessing minor's
maturity). But see In reAnonymous, 655 So. 2d 1052, 1053-54 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995) (reversing
trial court's denial ofwaiver where minor had "unpredictable" relationship with her mother and
virtually no relationship with her father but had spoken with and had support of stepfather);
In reT.P., 475 N.E.2d 312,314-15 (Ind. 1985) (affirming denial of waiver where 16-year old had
had prior abortion and testified that her parents would probably divorce if they discovered this
pregnancy); In re Petition ofJane Doe, 866 P.2d 1069, 1076 (Kan. App. 1994) (reversing trial
court's decision to deny waiver because 15-year old was still living with her family and had not
alleged abuse); In re Complaint ofJane Doe, 645 N.E.2d 134, 135 (Ohio App. 1994) (reversing
denial of waiver for woman who had described "horrible home life which more than justified
her desire to conceal her pregnancy from her parents" over dissent arguing that complainant
had failed to properly include allegations of abuse).
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likely to believe that a minor who elects it is not mature enough to
recognize her mistake. 61
The Court has ignored the lives of people subject to the parental
consent law much as it has ignored the lives of those subject to the ill-
conceived (and now obsolete) husband notification laws. The girls
are displaced by parents waving the banners of their own constitution-
al rights to parental authority and byjudges gauging whether they are
mature enough to exercise their constitutional rights to privacy.6 2
C. The Formality of Law
The phenomenon of the phantom woman is most remarkable in
the abortion funding cases." Here, the woman is not just sub-
sumed by anachronistic or idealized institutions; she is entirely
161. SeeTamar Lewin, Parental Consent to Abortion: How Enforcement Can Vary, N.Y. TIMES, May
28, 1992, at Al (noting that one Ohio judge denied a 1T7'Ayear old high school student waiver
because she had "'not had enough hard knocks in her life'"). On the other hand, the Supreme
Court of Alabama has held that "a minor's voluntary decision to use the judicial process and
request advice of legal counsel may, in itself, indicate maturity." Ex parte Anonymous, 595 So.
2d 497, 499 (ALa. 1992). That court had also reminded trial judges within its jurisdiction that
"it is not the [trial] court's responsibility to superimpose its judgment or its moral convictions
on the minor in regard to what course of action she should take with reference to her own
body." ExparteAnonymous, 618 So. 2d 722, 725 (Ala. 1993); see also In reMary Moe 423 N.E.2d
1038, 1043 (Mass. App. 1981) (reversing denial of waiver where trial court had used minor's
immaturity and general desirability of parental involvement as evidence that abortion was not
in her best interest).
162. See, e.g., In re Anonymous, 1995 WL 320389, at *4 (Ala. Civ. App. May 30, 1995)
(reversing trial court's denial of waiver where "the trial court misapplied the law to the
undisputed facts"); In reAnonymous, 597 So. 2d 709, 711 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992) (affirming trial
court's denial of waiver after remand where 14-year old girl was deemed insufficiently mature
to make decision to have abortion without any adult involvement); In reAnonymous, 597 So. 2d
225, 226 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992) (reversing trial court's denial of waiver after remand for lack of
evidence that abortion would not be in minor's best interest); ExparteAnonymous, 595 So. 2d
499, 502 (Ala. 1992) (reversing trial court's denial of waiver after remand from state supreme
court where trial court failed to make any findings as to minor's maturity); In re Anonymous,
549 So. 2d 1347, 1348 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989) (reversing trial court's denial of waiver for 15-year
old girl); ExparteAnonymous, 531 So. 2d 901, 907 (Ala. 1988) (granting waiver to 12-year old
girl at beginning of her second trimester); In -e Anonymous, 515 So. 2d 1254, 1255 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1987) (reversing trial court's denial of waiver despite general rule of deference due to trial
court, and noting that in some instances, "decision to seek the waiver... is itself an indicia of
maturity"); see also H.B. v. Wilkinson, 639 F. Supp. 952, 958 (D. Utah 1986) (upholding Utah's
parental notification statute and denying waiver to 17-year old); In reT.H., 484 N.E.2d 568, 571
(Ind. 1985) (affirming denial of waiver to 14-year old ward of state who did not know she was
pregnant until second trimester and whose foster mother supported her decision but where state
would not consent to abortion for unstated reasons).
163. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326-27 (1979) (holding that states participating
in Medicaid are not obligated to continue to fund medically necessary abortions exempt from
federal reimbursement); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977) (per curiam) (finding no
constitutional violation in electing to provide publicly financed hospital services for childbirth
without providing corresponding services for nontherapeutic abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464, 469-70 (1977) (holding that Equal Protection Clause does not require Medicaid state to pay
expenses incident to nontherapeutic abortions for indigent women even if state pays expenses);
Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 447-48 (1977) (finding Social Security Act does not require finding
of nontherapeutic abortions as condition of participation in Medicaid program).
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eclipsed by legal rationalizations thatjustify state and federal subsidies
for childbirth but not for abortion. This is true even where the
abortion is medically necessary and, again, despite purported
constitutional protection for abortion.
In Maher v. Roe,"6 the Court upheld Connecticut's refusal to fund
nontherapeutic abortions."6 Although the Court denied that it was
"unsympathetic to the plight of an indigent woman who desires an
abortion,"'" it completely ignored her situation. The Court funda-
mentally misconceived her predicament by finding that "an indigent
woman who desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage as a conse-
quence of Connecticut's decision to fund childbirth," but not
abortion, because "she continues as before to be dependent on
private sources for the service she desires." 67 Only a Court blinded
by legalisms to the actual life of a poor pregnant person could
conclude that it makes no difference to her whether or not the State
pays for her abortion.' 68
A full-scale jurisprudential battle developed in the trilogy of cases
of which Maher is a part. The majority in each case-Maher, Beal v.
Doe,'69 and Poelker v. Doe 7 0-- upheld state and local provisions
permitting or requiring public facilities to deny access to
nontherapeutic abortions to poor people who rely on public
assistance for their medical care.172  While the majority waxed
164. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
165. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 480-81 (1977).
166. 1& at 479.
167. Id. at 474.
168. The Court's analysis was legalistic in structure as well. In Maher, the Court held first
that Connecticut's regulation impinged on no fundamental right and then that it disadvantaged
no suspect class; all that remained was to decide that Connecticut had a rational basis for
favoring childbirth over abortion. Id. Some scholars have described this methodology as
intrinsically male. See Judith Baer, How Is Law Male? A Feminist Perspective on Constitutional
Interpretation, in FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: THE DIFFERENCE DEBATE 151 (Leslie Friedman
Goldstein ed., 1992). Writing about Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990),
Baer noted that the Court "took pains to separate its decision from the concrete situation that
produced the case [and rejected] the emotional, the experiential, and the individual in favor
of the rational, the detached, and the generalizable." Baer, supra, at 151. The favored features
are characteristic of both legal thinking and male thinking. This contrasts with the plurality's
discussion in Casey of reliance which is experiential and almost emotional, even if quite general.
See infra Part III (analyzing Court's discussion of reliance in Casey). It is interesting to note that
the O'Connor-Kennedy-Souter approach is criticized by ChiefJustice Rehnquist in his dissent
on this ground. See infra note 273.
169. 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
170. 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (per curiam).
171. Categorizing some abortions as therapeutic (i.e., medically necessary) and others as
nontherapeutic (i.e., chosen) ignores the range of reasons for which women seek abortions and
fact that the decision to do so is rarely meaningfully voluntary.
172. See Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977) (per curiam) (holding that Constitution
does not forbid state to prefer normal childbirth); Maher, 432 U.S. at 479-81 (holding that it is
not unreasonable for State to insist on showing of medical necessity to ensure proper spending
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formalistically, the dissenting Justices tried to articulate the adverse
costs to women, to children, and to the public."7 Justice Marshall,
in particular, linked the denial of abortion services to stigmatization,
racism, school segregation, and cycles of poverty, encouraged or
fostered by legislative and judicial choices. 4 He described some of
the difficulties incident to raising children, including the lack of child
care, the consequent inability to work, the cost of feeding and
clothing children, and the mother's own inability "to control the
direction of her own life."'75 The majority responded to the
dissent's concern with "the perceived impact of [the Court's]
decisions on indigent pregnant women who prefer abortion to
carrying the fetus to childbirth" by explaining that the dissent simply
"misconceive[d] the issues before us, as well as the role of the
judiciary."76
In Harris v. McRae,""' decided two years after this trilogy of cases,
the Court's analysis was even more legalistic and plaintiff Cora
McRae's absence from the Court's opinion was even more striking.
The Court held that McRae could not have a "medically necessary"
abortion if she could not pay for it; this was true, despite both her
constitutional right to choose and the medical necessity for the
abortion."' It was true because the federal government's refusal to
pay for abortions for Medicaid recipients "places no governmental
obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses to terminate her
pregnancy, but rather, by means of unequal subsidization of abortion
and other medical services, encourages alternative activity deemed in
the public interest.""' The disjunction between the legalistic
of funds); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 447 (1977) (holding that refusal to extend Medicaid
coverage to nontherapeutic abortions is not inconsistent with Title XIX).
173. See, e.g,, Poelker, 432 U.S. at 522-25 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Maher, 432 U.S. at 482-90
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Beal 432 U.S. at 448-63 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
174. See Bea, 432 U.S. at 454-62 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan made similar
points in Maher and Poelker. See Poeke, 432 U.S. at 522-25 (Brennan,J., dissenting); Maher, 432
U.S. at 482-90 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
175. Bea, 432 U.S. at 458-59 (Marshall,J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun also attempted to
remind the majority that " [ t] here is another world 'out there,' the existence of which the Court,
I suspect, either chooses to ignore or fears to recognize." Id. at 462-63 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Justice Blackmun also joinedjustice Brennan's dissents in Poekr and Maher. See
PoeLkr, 432 U.S. at 522-25 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Maher, 432 U.S. at 482-90 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
176. Bea4 432 U.S. at 447-48 n.15. The dispute over the role of the judiciary pits the
majority, which defers to the democratic process, against the dissenters who view the Court's role
as protecting the poor and the powerless against the vagaries of political majorities.
177. 448 U.S. 297 (1979).
178. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326-27 (1979) (holding that State is not obligated under
Title XIX to fund medically necessary abortions and that funding restrictions do not violate Fifth
Amendment or Establishment Clause of First Amendment).
179. 1& at 315.
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rhetoric and the real circumstances of McRae and others like her is
jarring. A woman whose life or health depends on an abortion that
she cannot afford may wonder what "alternative activity" means and
who deemed it to be in the public interest. She may also wonder who
this "public" is that can compel her to carry a dangerous pregnancy
to term and why they have any interest, let alone a prevailing one, in
her decision. Further, she may wonder how this public expects her
to care for her child and what it plans to do to help.
The trial in McRae's case took thirteen months, "produced a record
containing more than 400 documentary and film exhibits and a
transcript exceeding 5000 pages."8 0 Yet, the only thing about Cora
McRae the Supreme Court thought worth mentioning was that she
was "a New York Medicaid recipient then in the first trimester of a
pregnancy that she wished to terminate.""8' To a majority of the
Court, these cases are not about people who are not medically able
to carry their pregnancy to term but are too poor to pay for abortions
and must find the means to raise their children if born alive, all
despite the nominal constitutional protection for their right to
abortion. Instead, they are about states' rights, tiers of review in equal
protection and due process analysis, the state action doctrine,
Congress' spending power, the public interest, and a host of other
legal rules, categories, formalities, and legal fictions. The Court's
opinions have nothing to do with the real people whose cases bear
their names or the thousands of individuals like them.
8 2
The effects of this penchant for devaluing women's lives is clear.
A provision invalidated in 1983 is spared in 1992 when the formal
categories change because of personal politics inside the Court or
public politics outside. The categories change even though the actual
hardships and real medical necessities remain the same and are
equally real to people then as now. For instance, in Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health (Akron I), the Court struck down Ohio's
180. 1& at 305 n.6.
181. Id. at 303 (emphasis added).
182. The Court's preference for legalistic abstraction over factual context is not limited to
abortion cases. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 758 (1991) (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
In Coeman, Justice Blackmun objected to the majority's penchant for abstraction:
Federalism; comity;, state sovereignty;, preservation of state resources; certainty: The
majority methodically inventories these multifarious state interests... [without] any
mention of petitioner Coleman's right to a criminal proceeding free from constitution-
al defect or his interest in finding a forum for his constitutional challenge to his
conviction and sentence of death.
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24-hour waiting period i"u because of the State's failure to link the
requirement to maternal health.a The Court paid scant attention
to the actual plight of women who have to go to a clinic two days in
a row for a single procedure. Nine years later, the Court no longer
requires the State to act only to promote maternal health. Now the
requirement stands although the effect on women is the same."t
The Court in Webster followed the lead of Maher v. Roe, focusing on
the State's right to allocate "public resources, such as hospitals and
medical staff" 86 to areas other than abortion. Again, the Court did
not pay much attention to the effects of such de-allocation on
women. 87 "Nothing in the Constitution requires States to enter or
remain in the business of performing abortions,""s the Court said.
The Court recharacterized, then quickly dismissed, plaintiffs'
argument that "private physicians and their patients have some kind
of constitutional right of access to public facilities for the perfor-
mance of abortions,""8 9 again without recognizing why such a right
might be important to a pregnant person. This was a legal and
economic question, well within the legislature's discretion, not a
personal question within the individual's discretion." ° The Court
in Webster viewed Missouri's prohibition on public facilities performing
abortions not as a privacy issue, but as an equal protection issue that
was without merit: the state could rationally favor childbirth over
abortion, denying abortions to the class of women who "choose[] ...
to use a physician affiliated with a public hospital"191 even though
183. Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416,450 (1983) (Akron I) (finding
that Akron failed to demonstrate any legitimate state interest for arbitrary and inflexible waiting
period).
184. Id- at 451.
185. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2823 (1992) (overruling portions of
Akron I and Thornburgh that invalidated informed consent laws in part because Court saw "no
reason why the State may not require doctors to inform a woman seeking an abortion of the
availability of materials relating to the consequences to the fetus, even when those consequences
have no direct relation to her health"). Nevertheless, when the Supreme Court decides to
change legal standards, it can do so without regard to the dictum that underlay the prior rules.
Justice Blackmun's opinion in Thornburgh is unusual in its sympathetic attention to the rape
victim forced to hear the "gratuitous advice that an unidentified perpetrator is liable for
support" and to the patient with a life-threatening pregnancy for whom the recital of the
dangers of abortion would be "cruel as well as destructive of the physician-patient relationship."
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 763 (1985).
186. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 510 (1988) (citing Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)).
187. Id
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 521 (holding that "the goal of constitutional adjudication is surely not to remove
inexorably 'political divisive' issues from the ambit of the legislative process"); see also id. at 510
(discussing role of government expenditures and recoupment of expenditures).
191. Id.
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abortions would be available to women who chose private physicians.
The Court's logic rests on the unrealistic assumption that the choice
between public and private facilities is an entirely free one, as if
poverty and medical needs were voluntary conditions. The narrow-
ness of the Court's focus again limited its ability to recognize, or
permitted it to avoid recognizing, the actual impact of its ruling on
real people.192
III. C4SEYI MEETS THE WOMAN OF THE 90S
Until now, the Court has proceeded on two basic assumptions with
respect to abortion. First, men, acting as legislators, doctors, judges,
or husbands must have a role in women's private decisions. 9 '
Second, abortion is properly subject to restriction in order to
encourage childbirth or to reinforce women's traditional role in
society as nurturer and caregiver." The language in the first part
of Casey, however, suggests a new role for women not evident in the
Court's prior abortion decisions.19 5 Unlike the patient patients of
Roe and the phantoms that haunt the later cases, Casey women
participate in the nation's economy alongside men, have personal
dignity, and should and do shape their own destinies, unimpeded by
the cramped vision of women's lot that has predominated "in the
course of our history and our culture.""19
This shift in the depiction of the women who are at the center of
the abortion debate may signal a shift in the Court's thinking about
abortion itself. If the Court stops viewing women paternalistically and
starts -viewing them, like men, as autonomous and responsible
individuals, it may recognize that restrictive abortion liws limit
women's reproductive options and that, in turn, limits the opportuni-
192. Id. The Court, in a single paragraph, dismissed the suffering of the pregnant indigent
woman and those women who choose a physician affiliated with a public hospital. Id.
193. See MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 83, at 192.
Women were granted the abortion right as a private privilege, not as a public right.
Women got control over reproduction which is controlled by a man or The Man, an
individual man or the doctors or the government. Abortion was not so much
decriminalized as it was legalized. In Roe v. Wade, the government set the stage for the
conditions under which women got this right. Most of the control that women won
out of legalization has gone directly into the hands of men-husbands, doctors, or
fathers--and what remains in women's hands is now subject to attempted reclamation
through regulation. This, surely, must be what is meant by reform.
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
194. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 509 (1988) (citing Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980), for proposition that State can aid childbirth at expense of
abortion availability).
195. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2803-12.
196. I! at 2807.
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ties women have in other parts of their lives.197 Put in terms that
equal protection law can understand, women and men are similarly
situated because everyone has the right to "define one's own concept
of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life." ' Restrictive abortion laws that unequally burden
women's, but not men's, capacity to define their own lives should be
invalidated as violating the equality principle. If the Court adheres to
the conception of women suggested by the Casey dictum, it may find
that the harm caused by restrictive abortion laws derives from this
inequality, more than from some amorphous and not entirely
propitious concept of invasion of privacy. At the very least, the Court
should understand that it needs both strands of analysis to fully
address the harm done by such laws.
In Casey, the three authors of the lead opinion, Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter, emphatically stated that "the essential holding
of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again reaffirmed."",
The Court, however, upheld four of the most restrictive abortion
provisions enacted since Roe, including an informed consent require-
ment admittedly intended to discourage people from aborting,"° a
24-hour waiting period,2 °' and a parental consent provision applica-
ble to "unemancipated young wom[en] under 18. ''202 The Court
did strike down a provision requiring married women to certify that
they had notified their husband of their intent to have an abor-
tion.203
197. This shift also suggests a departure from the traditional view that women who seek
abortions (except in cases of rape or medical necessity), by definition, are not responsible
individuals.
198. d2 at 2807.
199. 1I at 2804.
200. IdL at 2824 (holding informed consent requirement is not undue burden). "[We
permit a State to further its legitimate goal of protecting the life of the unborn by enacting
legislation aimed at ensuring a decision that is mature and informed, even when in so doing the
State expresses a preference for childbirth over abortion." Id. (overruling Thornburgh and Akron
, to extent that they conflict).
201. Id at 2824. Upholding this provision also required the Court to depart from Akron I,
where the Court had held nine years earlier that "the State's legitimate concern that the
woman's decision be informed is [not] reasonably served by requiring a 24-hour delay as a
matter of course." Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 450 (1983)
(Akron I). The Court in Casey found "that conclusion to be wrong." Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2825.
202. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2832. The Court also upheld reporting and recordkeeping
requirements and the definition of medical emergency (in which narrow circumstances the
other provisions do not apply). Id. at 2832-33.
203. i& at 2826. The requirement would not apply if the woman certified to her doctor that
"her husband is not the man who impregnated her, that her husband could not be located; that
the pregnancy is the result of spousal sexual assault which she has reported; or that the woman
believes that notifying her husband will cause him or someone else to inflict bodily injury upon
her." I (citing PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3209 (Supp. 1991)). Pennsylvania was ostensibly trying
to get around the Danforth case by requiring merely notification to, and not consent of, the
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The lead opinion actually reads like two parts not of the same
whole. The first three main parts are discursive essays on the nature
of substantive due process and the meaning of individual liberty (Part
II),2"4 the nature of the Court's power to overrule precedent and its
relevance to Roe (Part III),2"5 and the relation of Casey's undue
burden test to Roe's trimester framework (Part IV).26 Finally, in a
relatively succinct fifth section, the Court analyzes the provisions
before it."7 Unlike the long, discursive preliminary sections, neither
the language nor the result of part five is markedly different from the
Court's prior opinions, with the possible exception of the discussion
of husband notification-the only provision the Court invalidates.
08
The language of the other sections, however, diverges markedly from
language in prior abortion cases and, for that matter, from most of
part five.
A. Women and Their Liberty
The Supreme Court's revival of substantive due process in the guise
of privacy, beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut, °9 has been criti-
cized as being without textual or other support in the Constitu-
tion,210  without precedential authority,21' result-oriented, 212 and
husband.
204. Id. at 2803-08.
205. Id. at 2808-16.
206. Id. at 2816-21.
207. Id. at 2816. An introduction (beginning with the word liberty), id. at 2803, and a
conclusion (essentially ending with the word liberty), id. at 2833, sandwich these four sections.
The sixJustices who did not sign the lead opinion all concurred and dissented in part. Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, Blackmun, and Scalia filed separate opinions.
208. Id at 2830 (holding that burden of husband notification is undue and, therefore,
unconstitutional).
209. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
210. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 508-09 (1965) (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
[Tihe Court talks about a constitutional 'right of privacy' as though there is some
constitutional provision or provisions forbidding any law ever to be passed which might
abridge the 'privacy' of individuals. But there is not. ... One of the most effective
ways of diluting or expanding a constitutionally guaranteed right is to substitute for the
crucial word or words of a constitutional guarantee another word or words, more or
less flexible and more or less restricted in meaning.
Id.; see also ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 110-26 (1990) (criticizing Supreme Court's
privacy jurisprudence on this ground);John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wof. A Comment on
Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE LJ. 920, 935-36 (1973) ("What is frightening about Roe is that this super-
protected right is not inferable from the language of the Constitution, the framers' thinking
respecting the specific problem in issue, any general value derivable from the provisions they
included, or the nation's governmental structure.").
211. See Griss0ok, 281 U.S. at 514-17 (Black,J., dissenting) (discussing inapplicability of cases
advanced in majority opinion). ChiefJustice Rehnquist's separate opinion in Casey also notes
the absence of precedents. "A reading of [prior) ... opinions makes clear that they do not
endorse any all-encompassing 'right of privacy.'" Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2859 (Rehnquist, CJ.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). John Hart Ely has also noted that
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manipulable."' The Court's privacy jurisprudence has additionally
been criticized for not being responsive to women,214 for obfuscat-
ing the real interests that actually animate the need for abortions,215
and for being a tool for male domination of women.1 6
Casey, however, emphasized liberty as distinct from pivay.217 The
Court placed its marriage/procreation/contraception/family/child-
rearing/education precedents2&1 directly in the Fourteenth Amend-
whatever right to privacy the pre-Roe cases did establish did not support the right to abortion.
Ely, supra note 210, at 929-30.
212. Grirwo" 381 U.S. at511-12 (Black,J., dissenting) (notingthat"[i]fthese formulas based
on 'natural justice' ... are to prevail, they require judges to determine what is or is not
constitutional on the basis of their own appraisal of what laws are unwise or unnecessary"); see
also Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1426-27 (1974). Professor
Henkin has noted:
We are not told what is the touchstone for determining 'fundamentality.' We are not
told why Privacy satisfies that test. ... What, then, is it that makes my right to use
contraceptives a right of Privacy, and fundamental, but my right to contract to work 16
hours a day... not a right of Privacy and not fundamental? Is it, as some suspect, that
the game is being played backwards: that the private right which intuitively commends
itself as valuable in our society in our time, or at least to a majority of ourJustices at
this time, is called fundamental, and if it cannot fit comfortably into specific constitu-
tional provisions it is included in Privacy?
Id.
213. SeeAlan Freeman & Elizabeth Mensch, The Public-Private Distinction in American Law and
Lif 36 BuFF. L. REv. 237, 239, 249 (1987) (describing manipulability and contingency of
public/private distinction given that "anything can be described as either public or private," and
showing how "the language of privatism [in the context of abortion] is a double-edged sword").
214. One commentator suggests that the Court's repeated failure "to say much about women
. may be the result of reliance on the conceptual and legal category of 'privacy' rather than
'equal protection.'" Henderson, supra note 28, at 1629. See generally Nadine Taub & Elizabeth
Schneider, Women's Subordination and the Roe of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE
CRITIQUE 151-57 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990) (describing harmful effects of relegating
women to "private" sphere insulated from law).
215. See Law, supra note 3, at 1020 (stating that "[t]he rhetoric of privacy, as opposed to
equality, blunts our ability to focus on the fact that it is women who are oppressed when abortion
is denied") (emphasis in original).
216. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 83, at 193, 194.
It is probably no coincidence that the very things feminism regards as central to the
subjection of women ... form the core of privacy doctrine's coverage.... Through
this perspective, the legal concept of privacy ... has protected a primary activity
through which male supremacy is expressed and enforced.... Privacy law keeps some
men out of the bedrooms of other men.
1di; see also Charlesworth et al., supra note 24, at 626 (noting that "a universal pattern of
identifying women's activities as private, and thus of lesser value, can be detected") (citations
omitted).
217. See supra note 207 and accompanying text (noting Casey's introductory and conclusory
use of the word "liberty").
218. The Court cited some cases that were, at least arguably, decided on privacy grounds.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2805-06 (citing Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (finding that
state's interest in prison security outweighed mentally ill prisoner's privacy interest in refusing
psychiatric drugs)); Careyv. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (invalidatingNewYork's
limitation on distribution of contraceptives); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972)
(extending Griswoldto unmarried individuals); Griswoldv. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,485 (1965)
(striking down prohibition on use of contraceptives by married people)). Other cases it cited
could have been decided on privacy grounds but were not. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
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ment's protection of liberty, literally without any reference to
privacy.219 "These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal
dignity and autonomy, are central to liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment."22 Thus, under the Casey analysis, these
matters are protected whether or not there is a constitutional right to
privacy, and regardless of any specific constitutional authority for such
right. 21 They are protected for the very broad reason that the
Constitution respects individual dignity and autonomy."22 This
departs from the rationales of the earlier cases justifying the constitu-
tional right to privacy on more narrow, case-specific grounds, such as
societal abhorrence of the right of "the police to search the sacred
precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contra-
ceptives"223 or the societal desire to protect the privacy of the
patient-physician relationship.224 Under Casey, these matters are
12 (1967) (striking down anti-miscegenation laws under Equal Protection Clause); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 161 (1944) (upholding parent's conviction for permitting daughter
to work in violation of state labor laws); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Williamson, 316 U.S. 535,
542 (1942) (striking down sterilization law for some inmates under Equal Protection Clause).
Only four of the cited cases concerned bodily invasions. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 535 (prohibiting
forced sterilization); Washington, 494 U.S. at 210 (authorizing use of drugs on mentally ill
patient); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985) (prohibiting surgical removal of bullet from
suspect); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173-74 (1952) (prohibiting stomach-pumping of
suspect). Two other cases concerned parental control over children's education. See Pierce v.
Society ofSisters, 268 U.S. 510,536 (1925) (striking down prohibition on private schools); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (striking down prohibition on teaching modern foreign
language in school).
219. See Casy, 112 S. Ct. at 2804-07.
220. Id. at 2807. The Court further noted that the State is not entitled to proscribe abortion
in all instances "because the liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the human
condition and so unique to the law." Id. This is the first time in an abortion case that the
Court has overcome what Professor Littleton would call the law's "phallocentric" bias: its
tendency to use the male experience as the standard and consequently to denigrate that which
is not part of the male experience. Christine A. Littleton, ReconstructingSexual Equality, 75 CAL.
L. REV. 1279, 1304 (1987). The Court in Casey recognized that reproductive ability is unique
to women but did not devalue it on that ground and thus finally confronted its obligation to
deal with reproduction as something other than a deviation from the male norm. See
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 83, at 217 (describing men's sexuality as
constituting standard to which women must show themselves to be similarly situated).
221. The lack of any mention of the right to privacy in the discussion of abortion as a
Fourteenth Amendment liberty issue permits the inference that the Court would protect these
matters whether or not the Court recognized a right to privacy.
222. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2805 (stating that "[i] t is a promise of the Constitution that there
is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter").
223. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
224. See, e.g., Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 445 (1983) (Akron I).
"By insisting upon recitation of a lengthy and inflexible list of information, Akron unreasonably
has placed 'obstacles in the path of the doctor upon whom [the woman is] entitled to rely for
advice in connection with her decision.'" Id. (DouglasJ, concurring) (quoting Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589, 604 n.33 (1977)). "The right of privacy has no more conspicuous place than in
the physician-patient relationship, unless it be in the priest-penitent relationship." Whalen, 429
U.S. at 604. See generally Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); Planned Parenthood v.
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protected because there is something far more fundamental at stake.
These issues are private, not in the sense of private-versus-public, but
in the sense of unique to each individual and going directly to what
makes that individual unique; they are private in virtually a spiritual
sense 21 that involves "personal decisions concerning ... human
responsibility and respect [for procreation] .,226
Although it is impossible to know for sure why the Justices in Casey
chose to focus on liberty rather than privacy, one reason that
immediately suggests itself is the Court's desire to reaffirm Roe without
being dependent on Roe's vulnerable constitutional doctrine. Thus,
Casey avoided the quicksand of privacy jurisprudence by relying
directly on the firmly grounded and unobjectionable liberty interest
explicitly guaranteed in the Bill of Rights.227 Another reason might
be to emphasize the breadth and complexity of the abortion issue by
locating whatever rights are incident to it in the broader liberty
interest, rather than in a narrower privacy right.
The shift noted here is in the level of generality at which the Court
analyzes abortion: liberty as conceived in Casey is broader than
privacy as conceived in Roe. But the shift has significant substantive
ramifications as well. Conceived as purely a question of privacy,
abortion analysis focuses on the government's obligation to let women
alone when they make the decision whether or not to continue a
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
225. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807 (holding that mother's liberty is at stake "in a sense unique...
to the law" which must be safeguarded against state encroachment). "The destiny of the woman
must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her
place in society." Id.
226. Id. Although the Casey opinion does not make the connection explicit, the right
alluded to here recalls freedom of conscience recognized under the First Amendment. See, e.g.,
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977) (holding that union dues cannot be
coerced because "in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience
rather than coerced by the State"); West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (striking
down compulsory pledge of allegiance because "[i f there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act
their faith therein"); see also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1977) (stating that
"individual freedom of mind" precludes requiring residents to adopt state motto on license
plates which "invades the sphere of intellect and spirit") (citations omitted).
227. See U.S. CONSr. amend. V, XIV. The plurality in Casey itself implied some discomfort
with the notion of privacy as established by CriswUak "Roe, however, may be seen not only as an
exemplar of Griswold liberty but as a rule (whether or not mistaken) of personal autonomy and
bodily integrity." Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2810; see also Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, 627 N.E.2d
570, 575 (1993) (noting that "it is not necessary to find a [state] constitutional right to privacy
in order to reach the conclusion that the choice of a woman whether to bear a child is one of
the liberties" guaranteed by Ohio Constitution). It is not clear whether Justice Blackmun
adopted the view that the plurality shifted its focus from privacy to liberty. See Casey, 112 S. Ct.
at 2844-45 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (applauding plurality's
"fervent view of individual liberty" but reviewing Court's historic protection of right to privacy).
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pregnancy. Abortion as a privacy issue compels a narrow inquiry and
does not even suggest the applicability of a broader understanding of
women's rights. Abortion as privacy, for instance, means that women
are protected against governmental intrusion but can make no claim
to governmental assistance.22 Abortion as a liberty issue, on the
other hand, permits a broader understanding of abortion that more
accurately reflects the multiple meanings of reproductive rights. That
a liberty analysis does not guarantee more sensitive results is evident
from the holdings of Casey which, while paying lip service to the
broader social interests involved in the abortion decision, upheld
exceedingly restrictive laws.2" The argument here, however, is that
viewing abortion in this broader liberty context is a necessary, though
obviously not sufficient, predicate to recognizing how restrictive
abortion laws in fact do affect women's lives. Privacy rhetoric has
never described and cannot describe what abortion restrictions really
mean.2" While privacy is about being let alone to make personal
decisions, liberty values who we are as individuals.
By identifying abortion as part of a more general liberty interest,
the Court raised the stature of the abortion decision, at least by
implication. Issues that go to one's own concept of existence are
protected from state regulation because they "define the attributes of
personhood" and therefore must not be "formed under compulsion
of the State."23' Thus, decisions about procreation, including
abortion, are protected because they significantly contribute to how
one defines oneself. When the State forces a woman to be pregnant,
or to abort, she is not who she wants to be, not able to define her
own life and destiny, based on her "own conception of her spiritual
imperatives."3 2 For the first time in the context of abortion, the
Court in Casey announced that women have the right to do these
228. The limits of privacyjurisprudence have been well documented. See, e.g., LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-10, at 1353 (2d ed. 1988) (commenting that
"[h] aving won abortion rights in Roe v. Wade in the name of abstract personal privacy, women
were poorly situated in Haris v. McRaeto demand public funds for the exercise of such rights").
229. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2822 (holding that abortion, unless threatening to life of mother,
is not medical emergency despite significant health risks); see also id. at 2824 (holding that
informed consent does not create undue burden).
230. The fact that liberty analysis does not inevitably yield results responsive to women's
needs justifies combining it with equal protection analysis. Allen, supra note 95, at 422
(embracing application of equal protection doctrine as well as liberty, over privacy doctrine to
abortion cases). It does not suggest any benefit from relying instead on privacy jurisprudence.
Id. at 423 (stating that "privacy jurisprudence should yield to a conceptually, jurisprudentially
and politically superior equal protection alternative").
231. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807.
232. ld.
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things, and that such a right has textual support in the Constitu-
tion.28
The Court's language is lofty and perhaps overly dramatic, unique
in abortion decisions and rare in Supreme Court opinions generally.
In fact, such language suggests a new attitude by the Supreme Court
toward the women who must choose between giving birth and
abortion. Instead of being condescending to women or ignoring
them altogether, the Court now sees before it individuals who have
the option, the responsibility, and indeed the constitutional right to
define themselves and to live their lives according to their own
imperatives. Abortion restrictions, like any law that compels one life
decision over another, impinge on that autonomy or liberty. If they
do so to women but not men, the burden is impermissibly unequal.
Moreover, Casey seems to recast even the concept of abortion as a
choice. Adherents to the pro-life perspective may view women who
seek abortions as having a meaningful choice between carrying a
pregnancy to term and ending it.2" Thus, except in cases where
abortion demonstrably is not a choice such as where pregnancy
endangers the woman's life or where conception resulted from
certifiable rape, there is little sympathy for those who need abortion
services. Any access to abortion other than in those instances is a
matter of legislative grace and subject to majoritarian preferences. 23 5
233. Other abortion cases have included stray phrases to this effect, but in none has it been
as prominent a theme as it is in Casey. SeeThornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
Our cases long have recognized that the Constitution embodies a promise that a
certain private sphere of individual liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach of
government. That promise extends to women as well as to men.... A woman's right
to make that choice freely is fundamental. Any other result, in our view, would protect
inadequately a central part of the sphere of liberty that our law guarantees equally to
all.
I& at 772 (citations omitted). Apparently this language has already become a part of
mainstream rhetoric. Former Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell has said
that "we should do everything possible to avoid [the choice of abortion] for a woman. But when
she faces that choice, ultimately I think she has to have control over her own destiny, her own
body." Martin Kasindorf& Patrickj. Sloyan, Everyone's WaitingforPowell, NEWSDAY, Oct. 29,1995,
at A7.
234. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2859 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(comparing fundamental right of abortion to liberty interest in "firing a gun ... into another
person's body"). This mischaracterization may, of course, result from the name of the "pro-
choice" movement. See Ann Scales, Feminist Legal Method: Not So Scary, 2 UCLA WoMEN's LJ. 1,
12 (1992) (describing choice as an "allegedly neutral premise" and pointing out that under
Supreme Court precedents, states can deny funding "for a poor woman to have an abortion, so
long as she can still choose to have an abortion") (emphasis in original).
235. In other contexts as well, the Court has viewed pregnancy as a completely voluntary
choice. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 130 (1976) (holding that insurance need
not cover pregnancy because it is voluntary condition and not medical condition such as
disease). This is incompatible with the traditional view of childbearing as a matter of social
responsibility. See supra note 134.
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The Court in Casey, however, seemed to take a more expansive,
liberated view of the decisionmaking process itself. The Court
specifically included within its scope of constitutional protection
women who become pregnant "despite [their] attempts to avoid
it."2"' This ostensibly refers not just to women who try to avoid
being raped, but to women who choose to have sex but try to avoid
pregnancy. '" This suggests the Court's attempt to stop blaming
women who choose to have non-procreative sex and to recognize that
they are as entitled as men, and as rape victims, to constitutional
protection of their right to define their own destiny. It also suggests
judicial recognition that abortion is not something women choose.
Like choosing chemotherapy, it is only a choice in the narrow sense
that the alternative seems worse.2"
But Casey went even further. It brought within its scope of
protection not just women who were raped and not just women who
chose to have sex, but all women and, indeed, all people, women and
men alike.239
[F]or two decades of economic and social developments, people
have organized intimate relationships and made choices that define
their views of themselves and their places in society, in reliance on
the availability of abortion in the event that contraception should
fail. The ability of women to participate equally in the economic
and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to
control their reproductive lives.2 40
236. Casey, 112 S. Ct at 2808.
237. Id. "Abortion is customarily chosen as an unplanned response to the consequence of
unplanned activity or to the failure of conventional birth control." Id. at 2809. The breadth of
the term "unplanned activity" seems to include rape and incest, as well as consensual but
spontaneous sexual activity, the latter being traditionally the most morally objectionable and
least worthy ofjudicial sympathy or constitutional protection. Id. In this opinion, however, the
Court did not distinguish between victims of rape and women who deliberately have unprotected
sex. It also included women who try in good faith to protect themselves. This is certainly more
in keeping with the way other public health decisions are made. So far, AIDS treatment is not
denied to people who voluntarily have unprotected sex or cancer treatment to people who
voluntarily smoke or live with smokers.
238. See Scales, supra note 234, at 12 (describing this "choice" as being as meaningful as
choice to be Princess of Wales or Aretha Franklin).
239. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2831. "The Constitution protects all individuals, male or female,
married or unmarried, from the abuse of governmental power. ..." Id.
240. Id. at 2809. Many people have linked the right-to-life movement to efforts to retard this
development. "Indeed, those who most violendy oppose the pro-choice position make an
explicit connection between such opposition and their desire that women be put back in their
traditional roles," seeing "abortion rights as a force that would destroy the traditional family unit
and motherhood." TsuBE, CLASH OF ABSOLUTES, supra note 3, at 237-38 (internal quotations
omitted). By contrast, this language downplays the differences between men and women, rather
than using those differences, and in particular the differences in reproductive capabilities, as a
basis for disadvantaging women.
19951 RECONSIDERING ABORTION LAW 125
Laurence Tribe has said that the failure to recognize this would
"operate ... to the serious detriment of women as a class, given the
myriad ways in which unwanted pregnancy and unwanted children
burden the participation of women as equals in society. Even a
woman who is not pregnant is inevitably affected by her knowledge of
the power relationships thereby created."24 1 In fact, the plurality
concluded, many people have "ordered their thinking and living
around" Roe.
242
Thus, to the Court in Casey, the participation of women, like men,
in the economic and social life of the nation is constitutionally
meaningful.24' The recognition that abortion laws affect such
participation, and must be especially carefully appraised because of
such effect, is remarkable in the course of Supreme Court jurispru-
241. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 228, at 1354.
242. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2809. This opinion would correspond to what Laurence Tribe has
called a post-Newtonian understanding of the effects of constitutional law on people, which
contrasts sharply with Casey's predecessors. Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional
Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1, 13 (1989) [hereinafter
Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space] (analogizing judiciary's effect on "the legal space
through which we all move to changes in understanding of physics"). "The Roe v. Wade opinion
ignored the way in which laws regulating pregnant women may shape the entire pattern of
relationships among men, women, and children.... That vision described a part of the truth,
but only what might be called the Newtonian part." Id. at 16. In essence, the decision in Casey
to reaffirm Roe answered the question that Tribe suggested ought to be asked: "[Wlhether the
state's combination of acts and omissions, rules, funding decisions and the like, so shaped the
legal landscape in which women decide matters bearing on their reproductive lives [that
reversing Roe] would violate the Constitution's postulates of liberty and equality." Id. at 32.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia also criticized Casey's acknowledgement of the
relationship between law and life. Rehnquist dismissed it as "undeveloped and totally
conclusory. In fact, one can not be sure to what economic and social developments the opinion
is referring." Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2862 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Professor Tribe's comment about the significance of stare decisis is also relevant here:
"[W] hen courts make observations about the legal landscape, they may ... deeply alter the
terrain itself." Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space, supra, at 32. Although nominally
reaffirmed, Roe was so ravaged by Casey that two justices suggested that it was all but overruled.
See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2855 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (calling
decision "a wholesale retreat from the substance" of Roe); id. at 2883 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (stating that "[t]he only principle the Court did 'adhere' to .. . is
the principle that the Court must be seen as standing by Roe"). Of course, the argument that
the Court ought to take responsibility for its role in society does not necessarily compel the
conclusion that even a case on which millions have relied should not be overruled. See generally
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896)); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (overruling Lochner v. NewYork,
198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
243. Professor Strauss has suggested that "throughout our history--for example, in the
opposition to slavery, the exaltation of freedom of contract at the turn of the century, and the
centrality of employment discrimination to civil rights issues today-the right to alienate one's
labor has been highly valued, and that is evidence that a person is not regarded as fully human
in our society unless he or she is allowed to participate in the labor market." Strauss, supra note
21, at 19.
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dence concerning the status of women. In addition, by focusing
on liberty, Casey took the abortion issue out of the adversarial context
of woman against fetus2  and put it in the potentially more con-
structive context of autonomy and the ability to define one's own
concept of existence-all those things that men have always had and,
in fact, that law was devised to protect for men.246  To the extent
that women are entitled to these things, and Casey announced for the
first time that they were, women and men are similarly situated, and
laws that burden women's exercise of those rights violate the
guarantee of equal protection.
B. Women and Their Doctors
The language in Casey departed from prior decisions most
dramatically when it spoke of the woman-as-patient. Directly
repudiating its former characterization of the doctor-patient relation-
ship, Casey said that that relationship "does not underlie or override
the two more general rights under which the abortion right is
justified: the right to make family decisions and the right to physical
autonomy."'247 The doctor-patient relationship, the Court said, is
"derivative of the woman's position," and not, as the earlier cases had
244. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974) (failing to recognize relationship
between work and pregnancy). But see Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 640
(1974) (invalidating mandatory maternity leave under Due Process Clause).
245. At least one commentator has described the adversarial attitude as deriving from
Thomas Hobbes' competitive view of human nature. "'[I]f any two men desire the same thing,
which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their End,
(which is principally their owne conservation .... ) endeavour to destroy, or subdue one an
other.'" Robin WestJurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1988) (quoting THOMAS
HOBBES, LEviATHAN 183-84 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1968)). Professor West shows:
The culture thinks about harm, and violence, and therefore self defense, in a particular
way, namely a Hobbesian way, and a Hobbesian conception of physical harm cannot
possibly capture the gender-specific subjective harm that constitutes the experience of
unwanted pregnancy. From a subjective, female point of view, an abortion is an act
of self-defense, (not the exercise of a "right to privacy") but from the point of view of
masculine subjectivity, an abortion can't possibly be an act of self-defense: the fetus
is not one of Hobbes' "relatively equal" natural men against whom we have a right to
protect ourselves.
Id at 69.
246. See generally id. (describing how "Rule of Law" recognizes traits associated with men
(autonomy and freedom) and protects against what men fear (annihilation), but neither values
traits associated with women (intimacy and connection) nor protects against what women fear
(intrusion and separation)). Professor MacKinnon also has written extensively about this:
"Human rights, including 'women's rights,' have implicitly been limited to those rights that men
have to lose .... Abstract equality has never included those rights that women as women need
most and never have had. All this appears rational and neutral in law because social reality is
constructed from the same point of view." MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEmiNIST THEORY, supra note
83, at 229.
247. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2824.
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made clear, definitive of it.' Indeed, the Casey woman makes
personal decisions independently of her doctor's medical judgment.
"An entire generation has come of age free to assume Rods concept
of liberty in defining the capacity of women to act in society, and to
make reproductive decisions," without a doctor's intrusion into the
decisionmaking process. 249 Abortion laws, in this view, affect women
as decisionmakers, as autonomous actors in society, rather than
merely as patients dependent on others to direct their lives. In this
view, abortion is finally recognized as more than a medical decision.
It is a life decision.
Justice Blackmun, the architect of the woman-as-patient motif, has
also recognized its limitations, now opting for the more expansive
view of abortion taken by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter.
The rhetorical tone of his separate opinion in Casey was consistent
with that of the lead opinion and, in several instances, he adopted the
plurality's language." ° Justice Blackmun's focus is now squarely on
the "unique role of women in the decision-making process" rather
than on the primacy of the physician's role.211  Indeed, Justice
Blackmun referred almost two dozen times to the woman's rights and
to her exclusive interest in the decision, with hardly a single reference
to the rights of the physician.252 He even noted that "because
248. Id. (emphasis added). This is also perhaps the place where the inconsistency between
the dictum and the holding is the sharpest Here, the Court ignored its own dictum in
upholding the informed consent provision, in which the doctor's admittedly biased information
defines the scope of the woman's right. Id. at 2825.
249. Id. at 2812. It is ironic that the protective restrictions afforded to women in justice
Blackmun's woman-as-patient paradigm are broader than those afforded to the Casey woman-as-
decisionmaker, but there is no reason why the relative degrees of protection inhere in the
paradigms. In fact, the difference results from the use of strict scrutiny or undue burden within
the paradigm. Seeinfranote 331 and accompanying text (discussing Casey's undue burden test).
Indeed, the Court's particular selection of tests notwithstanding, it would make sense for the
broader protection to apply to the autonomous, decisionmaking adult and the lesser protection
to the patient whose interests are, by definition, circumscribed by her medical condition.
250. Casey, 112 U.S. at 2842-45 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
251. Id at 2845 (Blackmun,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
252. Justice Blackmun referred to the rights of the physician in the limited context of the
informed consent provision and there he quoted from an earlier opinion. Id. at 2850
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"[T] he listing of agencies in the printed Pennsylvania form ... contains names of
agencies that well may be out of step with the needs of the particular woman and thus
places the physician in an awkward position and infringes upon his or her professional
responsibilities. Forcing the physician or counselor to present the materials and the
list to the woman makes him or her in effect an agent of the State in treating the
woman and places his or her imprimatur upon both the materials and the list. All this
is, or comes close to being, state medicine imposed upon the woman, not the
professional medical guidance she seeks, and it officially structures-as it obviously was
intended to do-the dialogue between the woman and her physician."
Id (BlackmunJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 763 (1986)).
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trained women counselors are often more understanding than
physicians, and generally have more time to spend with patients, the
physician-only disclosure requirement" does not withstand constitu-
tional scrutiny.
253
Furthermore, as the quotation opening this Article indicates,Justice
Blackmun seems to have recognized the importance of considering
the "social context" of abortion.2 4 He explicitly argued that abor-
tion restrictions "conscript women's bodies into [the service of the
State], forcing women to continue their pregnancies, suffer the pains
of childbirth, and in most instances, provide years of maternal care,"
and that the assumption that women owe this duty to the State
appears "to rest upon a conception of women's role that has triggered
the protection of the Equal Protection Clause."25
Justice Blackmun disagreed with Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter on the appropriate standard of review and the actual scope of
the Roe holding. 6 Justice Blackmun continued to argue for strict
scrutiny257 and to advocate the trimester framework, which would
render unconstitutional several of the provisions upheld by the
plurality.258 Nonetheless, he and Justice Stevens, along with the
three-member plurality, agreed that although the Roe attitude towards
women may have been acceptable in 1973, it no longer fits women's
role in society, and it fails to encompass the full significance of
abortion to women.259
C. Women and Their Husbands
The only provision the Court in Casey invalidated provided that,
with a few narrow exceptions, "no physician shall perform an abortion
on a married woman without receiving a signed statement from the
woman that she has notified her spouse that she is about to undergo
an abortion."2" The woman could certify to her doctor that "her
husband is not the man who impregnated her; that her husband
253. Id (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
254. Id. at 2845 (BlackmunJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also iU at 2853
(BlackmunJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing Chief Justice's "complete
omission of any discussion of the effects that compelled childbirth and motherhood have on
women's lives" and his lack of"concern with women's health" and taking broader view of what
reaffirmation of Roe would require).
255. Id. at 2846-47 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
256. Id. at 2853-54 (Blackmun,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that
plurality's "undue burden" standard is "arbitrary and capricious").
257. Id. at 2847-50 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
258. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
259. Id at 2849 (Blackmun,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
260. Id. at 2826 (citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 3209 (1989)).
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could not be located; that the pregnancy is the result of spousal
sexual assault which she has reported; or that the woman believes that
notifying her husband will cause him or someone else to inflict bodily
injury upon her. '261' The discussion of this requirement differs in
length and tone from the opinion's analyses of the other provisions.
It is unusual for a Supreme Court opinion, and especially for recent
non-dissenting opinions, for its effort to acknowledge the real lives of
disempowered people. 2
One fundamental difference between the lead opinion and that of
the Chief Justice is how each responded to the fact that most women
consult with their husbands even in the absence of legislation
compelling them to do so. Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that
because of this, "the vast majority of wives... suffer no burden as a
result of the provision."263 The plurality, however, seemed to
recognize that the injury to women is not in the act of notification,
but in the compulsion.26  In certain instances, the law may not
compel obedience even though most people would voluntarily
comply. For example, even if most people would willingly pledge
their allegiance to the national flag, a law that forces one to do so is
unconstitutional because it does not respect each person's right to
decide for herself.26  This is particularly true in the context of
compelled communication,2" although it was not an explicit basis
261. Id. The district court noted some of the provision's loopholes, including its require-
ment that women notify their husbands-even if they were raped by their husbands but did not
report the rape within 90 days, or if they feared that notifying their husbands would result in
emotional or economic injury to themselves, or if they feared that injury to someone else, such
as a child, could result. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1360 (E.D.
Pa. 1990)). The husband notification provision is clearly intended to protect and benefit
husbands of women seeking abortions. Id. at 2826-31; see also supra text accompanying note 123.
A violation of this provision would render the physician liable to the husband in damages. Casey,
744 F. Supp. at 1360.
262. Nonetheless, the plurality opinion has been criticized for focusing on the plight of
white, middle class women. See COLKER, supra note 3, at 91 (noting that Court in Casey
"understood the problem of violence in the private sphere for pregnant married women, who
are disproportionately older, white, and middle class, but did not understand this problem for
pregnant unmarried women, who are disproportionately younger, African-American, andpoor").
263. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2870 n.2 (Rehnquist, C.J., White, Scalia, Thomas,J.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (citing Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1360).
264. Id. at 2829.
265. Id. at 2807; see West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
(overturning state statute compelling school children to salute flag and pledge allegiance); see
also United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318-19 (1990) (striking down federal prohibition
of flag burning as protest); Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (striking down Texas'
prohibition of flag burning as protest).
266. "At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide
for him or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence.
... Government action that.., requires the utterance of a particular message favored by the
Government[] contravenes this essential right" and is subject to "the most exacting scrutiny."
Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2458-59 (1994); Compelling personal speech
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for the plurality's decision to strike down the notification provision.
For Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, the first defect of the
law was its effect on the women who would not otherwise tell their
husbands of their intent to undergo abortion surgery. 67 Quoting
the findings of the district court, the Supreme Court emphasized that
more than two million women are victims of domestic violence every
year;2" in finding after finding, the Court relentlessly undermined
the illusion of idealized American marriages. Many married women,
the Court said, would have "very good reasons for not wishing to
inform their husbands."269 The Court considered these people to
be "reasonable"270 and held that the law's failure to let people
decide for themselves whether to tell their husbands rendered it
unconstitutional.27'
By contrast, Chief'Justice Rehnquist focused on instances where the
decision not to tell the husband is neither reasonable nor supported
by objective evidence. 22 In some of the situations he found signifi-
cant, the married woman was "'initially inclined to obtain an abortion
without [her] husband['s] knowledge because of perceived prob-
lems-such as economic constraints, future plans, or the husband ['s]
about one's body in the intimate context of marriage is no less suspect. Furthermore, this
explains in part the injury caused by the informed consent and 24-hour waiting period
requirements. Most people want as much information as possible about any medical procedure
they are considering and most women considering abortion undoubtedly think about abortion
for more than 24 hours before committing to it. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 284143 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Nonetheless, the State's control over the thought
process, in time and content, impermissibly intrudes into liberty and conscience of person. Id.
at 2853-54 (BlackmunJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
267. Id. at 2828-29.
268. 1& at 2826 (adopting district court's finding that "[s] tudies reveal that family violence
occurs in two million families in the United States"). Noting that "researchers estimate that one
of every two women will be battered at some time in their life," the district court found that this
was a conservative figure that substantially understated the actual number of families affected
by domestic violence because battering is usually not reported until it reaches life-threatening
proportions. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1361 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
269. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2828.
270. I& at 2829-30.
271. I& at 2830 ("[Mlany may have a reasonable fear that notifying their husbands will
provoke further instances of child abuse; these women are not exempt from § 3209's notification
requirement." (citing Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1360)).
The "bodily injury" exception could not be invoked by a married woman whose
husband, if notified, would, in her reasonable belief, threaten to (a) publicize her
intent to have an abortion to family, friends or acquaintances; (b) retaliate against her
in future child custody or divorce proceedings; (c) inflict psychological intimidation
or emotional harm upon her, her children or other persons; (d) inflict bodily harm
on other persons such as children, family members or other loved ones; or (e) use his
control over finances to deprive of necessary monies for herself or her children..
The women most affected by this law-those who most reasonably fear the consequenc-
es of notifying their husbands that they are pregnant-are in the gravest danger.
Id at 2831.
272. Id. at 2870-71.
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previously expressed opposition-that may be obviated by discussion
prior to the abortion.'"2 3 Thus, married women are so likely to
make the wrong decision that the law may compel them to consult
with their clear-headed husbands.
Throughout this discussion, the dissent subordinated the actual
harms done to women to the legal fictions that justify state regula-
tion.2 4 "The spousal notice provision will admittedly be unneces-
sary in some circumstances, and possibly harmful in others, but 'the
existence of particular cases in which a feature of a statute performs
no function (or is even counterproductive) ordinarily does not render
the statute unconstitutional or even constitutionally suspect.'" 75 But
this misperceives the position of the lead opinion. In the view of
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, the risk of husband
notification is not counterproductivity (i.e., will the statute actually
discourage discussion that might otherwise have taken place?), but
rather, violence. 76
The attitude articulated in the Casey dissent has precedent as far
back as Justices White and Rehnquist's dissents in Roe v. Wade and Doe
v. Bolton.
At the heart of the controversy in these cases are those recurring
pregnancies that pose no danger whatsoever to the life or health of
the mother but are, nevertheless, unwanted for any one or more of
a variety of reasons-convenience, family planning, economics,
dislike of children, the embarrassment of illegitimacy, etc. The
common claim before us is that for any one of such reasons, or for
no reason at all, and without asserting or claiming any threat to life
or health, any woman is entitled to an abortion at her request ....
[Under the majority's holding,] the Constitution of the United
States values the convenience, whim, or caprice of the putative
mother more than the life or potential life of the fetus ... .277
This view assumes that the most serious reason a married woman
could have for needing an abortion is economic and not personal or,
in the words of the Casey plurality, "spiritual."278 In Roe and Doe, as
273. Id. at 2871 (emphasis added) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey. 947 F.2d 682, 726
(3d Cir. 1991) (Alito,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). This view perpetuates the
unfounded stereotype that women do not understand money. See generally Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE LJ. 1281, 1293 (1991) (discussing
legal inequities that result from harm of gender stereotyping).
274. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2869-72 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
275. Id at 2871-72 (Rehnquist, Cj., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Thomburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 800 (1986)
(White, J., dissenting)).
276. Id. at 2827-29.
277. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221 (1973) (White, RehnquistJ.J., dissenting).
278. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807.
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in Casey, the Justices' views of the regulations seem colored by their
perception of women's reasonableness. Simply put, the plurality and
the dissent disagreed as to whether a state legislature may act on the
irrebuttable presumption that women are unreasonable. Further-
more, Chief Justice Rehnquist's view legitimates the legislative
presumption that women are so likely to misperceive their family's
financial or other situation that State-compelled disclosure to a
husband about a wife's exercise of her constitutional right is justified.
This, of course, turns the privacy inquiry inside out by requiring the
person who has the constitutional right to privacy to justify to the
State why she wishes to exercise it. This is akin to insisting that a
criminal defendant explain why she is electing not to testify. This
argument demonstrates privacy doctrine's malleability and may
suggest another reason why, at least in the context of abortion, it has
not proven effective at invalidating restrictive laws.
The plurality's analysis, however, was not limited to the two million
women who would reasonably decline to tell their husbands about an
abortion. The Court also addressed the broader question of whether
it is ever permissible for a state to compel communication from a wife
to her husband. 9  In this part of the analysis, the Court came
closest to fulfilling the promise of its earlier rhetoric and of directly
implicating equal protection analysis. The Court said that, regardless
of whether most women would discuss abortions with their husbands,
the husband notification requirement is unconstitutional because it
treats women as subordinate to men by requiring them to have this
discussion.280 Further, the Court took pains to note that, while this
may have been acceptable at common law, it does not accord with our
current understanding of the Constitution. 81 In this section, the
Court fused together questions of equal protection and liberty, of
women's traditional role in society and abortion.282
The Court compared the relative interests of the man and the
woman and found that "as a general matter.., the father's interest
in the welfare of [a living child] and the mother's interest are equal."
While the wife is still pregnant, however, her interest in the pregnancy
is greater.2s With respect to the specific condition of pregnancy,
then, husbands and pregnant wives are not similarly situated, and the
279. Id. at 2829-30.
280. IM. at 2831.
281. See id.
282. See id. at 2827-31.
283. Id. at 2830. Here, the woman's predominant role in the pregnancy moves from the
supporting position of such cases as Danforth to center stage. See supra notes 70-93 and
accompanying text (discussing Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)).
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notification provision is therefore unconstitutional because it treats
dissimilarly situated people similarly, requiring both to participate
virtually equally in the decisionmaking process.2 84
The Court then used such un-equal protection cases as Bradwell v.
Illinois,285 and Hoyt v. Forida,286 to show that the outdated views of
women's role in society as subordinate to their husbands and limited
to nurturing families are not constitutionally tenable anymore.287
Such cases, the Court said, "are no longer consistent with our
understanding of the family, the individual, or the Constitution. "2ta
According to the Court, the State's interest in restricting abortion
impermissibly corresponds to "its own vision of the woman's role"
which, although "dominant... in the course of our history and our
culture," is no longer a constitutionally valid basis for legislation.
289
284. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2830-31. In fact, the Pennsylvania provision did not mandate
absolute equal participation by husband and wife, since the husband's consent was not required.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit 18, § 3209 (1989). The wife, therefore, could override his disapproval. Id
Nonetheless, the Court intimated that even notification violates the equality principle. See infra
notes 295-98 and accompanying text (discussing how equal protection analysis applies, despite
this partial dissimilarity).
285. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872). This case is now best known for Justice Bradley's
concurring opinion which embodies the "separate spheres" ideology.
The civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the
respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be, woman's
protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs
to the female sex evidently unfits it for man of the occupations of civil life. The
constitution of the family organization... indicates the domestic sphere as that which
properly belongs to the domain and function of womanhood.
Id. at 141.
286. 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961) (upholding Florida statute excluding women from compulsory
jury service because women are "still regarded as the center of home and family life").
287. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2830-31.
288. I& at 2791, 2831. These cases have previously been disclaimed by the Court, but never
in an abortion decision. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725
(1982) (invalidating state school's denial of admission to male nursing candidate); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1971) (invalidating benefits differential for families of
servicewomen).
289. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807. The image of women's role in society is well illustrated by an
1871 report of the American Medical Association's Committee on Criminal Abortion describing
the woman needing an abortion.
She becomes unmindful of the course marked out for her by Providence, she overlooks
the duties imposed on her by the marriage contract. She yields to the pleasures-but
shrinks from the pains and responsibilities of maternity; and, destitute of all delicacy
and refinements, resigns herself, body and soul, into the hands of unscrupulous and
wicked men. Let not the husband of such a wife flatter himself that he possesses her
affection. Nor can she in turn ever merit even the respect of a virtuous husband. She
sinks into old age like a withered tree, stripped of its foliage; with the stain of blood
upon her soul, she dies without the hand of affection to smooth her pillow.
Aflee & O'Donnell, supra note 73, at 239, 241. This description obviously isolates the woman,
without sympathy or compassion, in her predicament and "link[s] doctor and husband as the
equally wronged and innocent parties. The aborting wife, in contrast, [is] unnaturally selfish
and ruthless." Brief of 281 Historians, supra note 35, at 17-18 n.55 (quoting CARROLL SMITH-
ROSENBERG, DISORDERLY CONDUcr 236-37 (1985)); see also TRIBE, CLASH OF ABSOLUTES, supra
note 3, at 33 (noting that this same description "pit[s] husbands, who must often have
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Casey marks the first time in an abortion case that the Court has
explicitly abandoned the separate spheres ideology that justified its
earlier cases regarding women's rights.
Cas, of course, recognized women's role in the perpetuation of
the species but, unlike the earlier abortion decisions, it did not permit
the State to justify restrictions on women on the basis of biological
differences between women and men."9 "That these sacrifices have
from the beginning of the human race been endured by woman with
a pride that ennobles her in the eyes of others and gives to the infant
a bond of love cannot alone be grounds for the State to insist she
make the sacrifice."29' Finally, the Court recognized that the ability
to give birth is a biological privilege, not an opportunity for the State
to constrict women's lives.
292
According to the Court, our current understanding of the Constitu-
tion is that it "protects individuals, men and women alike, from
unjustified state interference."29  Although the rhetoric sounds like
equality language, the Court did not take the final step of explicitly
finding the Equal Protection Clause to be applicable to abortion
legislation. Instead, it persisted in relying on women's liberty
interests, finding that "Section 3209 embodies a view of marriage
consonant with the common-law status of married women, but
repugnant to our present understanding of marriage and of the
nature of the rights secured by the Constitution. Women do not lose
their constitutionally protected liberty when they mary.1
294
participated in decisions to terminate pregnancy" or caused need for abortions in first place,
against their wives). As noted in the Brief of 281 Historians, supra note 35, at 18, the Supreme
Court echoed this language the next year in its description of women's place in society in
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872); see also supra note 285 (discussing "separate
spheres" ideology).
290. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807.
291. IL
292. Id.
293. l at 2830.
294. Id. at 2831. The ChiefJustice would have upheld this provision for two reasons. First,
by requiring only notification and not consent, the state was not delegating any veto power that
it did not have. Id at 2869-70 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Second, since plaintiffs had challenged the law on its face, they had to "show that no set of
circumstances exists under which the provision would be valid." Id. at 2870 (Rehnquist, CJ.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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IV. RECONSTRUCTING CASEY: TREATING SIMILARLY SITUATED
PEOPLE EQUIVALENTLY
A. Wht Does Equality Mean?
Many scholars have legitimately criticized the equality principle
which provides that similarly situated people ought to be treated
similarly and that non-similarly situated people ought not to be
treated similarly.29 The Court has persistently fueled these criti-
cisms by using the equality principle as a sword to deny women rights
to reproductive freedom, rather than as a shield to help women
escape the discriminatory practices of the past.
2 96
Nonetheless, the equality principle may have some value, even in
the area of reproductive rights. First, it has a certain logical appeal
in that it makes little sense to treat unequal things equally.2"
Second, if applied broadly enough, it can be a valuable tool for
establishing and preserving reproductive and other rights.2 98  It is
necessary, however, to find an appropriate standard by which to
295. "If women ask to be treated the same as men on the grounds that we are the same, then
we concede that we have no claim to equality in contexts where we are not the same." Scales,
supra note 234, at 11. Professor Macrinnon has also emphasized that focusing on gender-i.e.
that which makes women different from men-to gain equal treatment is inherently futile.
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 83, at 217-18. She also has commented
that "[s]ex equality becomes a contradiction in terms, something of an oxymoron, which may
suggest why we are having such a difficult time getting it." CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 33 n.19 (1979). This is what Professor Martha Minow calls
"the difference dilemma." MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION,
EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 74 (1990). Professor Minow states that "if equality depends on
'sameness,' then the recurrence of difference undermines the chances for equality... [and t] he
fear of emphasizing difference, whether by acknowledgment or non-acknowledgment, arises as
long as difference carries stigma and precludes equality." Id, This has been a particularly
difficult problem in the context of reproductive rights because of the biological nature of
reproductive differences.
296. See, eg., Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 762 (1993) (holding
that women seeking abortions do not constitute discrete group for purposes of 42 U.S.C. §
1983); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 134 (1976) (holding that exclusion of
pregnancy from disability-benefits plan providing general coverage is not gender-based
discrimination under either Equal Protection Clause or Title VII because pregnancy is unique);
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 n.20 (1974) (stating that question of pregnancy
discrimination "is thus a far cry from cases like Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), involving discrimination based upon gender as such").
Professor Littleton has recognized that underlying both Geduldig and Gilbert "was the
unarticulated assumption that pregnancy was a real difference, and that equality was therefore
simply inapplicable." Littleton, supra note 220, at 1306.
297. Dean Kay has noted that what has come to be known as the equality principle in
American jurisprudence derives from Aristotle's NICOMACHEAN ETHICS. Herma Hill Kay, Equality
and Difference: The Case of Prignancy, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S Lj. 1, 26 & n.138 (1985) (quoting
NICHMACHEAN ETHICS v.3. 1113a-13b (W. Ross trans., 1925) (stating "'[eiquality in morals
means this: things that are alike should be treated alike, while things that are unalike should
be treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness'")).
298. Kay, supra note 297, at 23 n.125.
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measure the equality claim for the purpose of establishing reproduc-
tive rights. The critical questions are: What elements are relevant to
determining whether two entities are in fact similar?; and What
constitutes equal treatment, once entitlement to equality has been
recognized? Again, Casey has laid some of the groundwork for
answering these questions in the context of abortion.
In the context of reproductive rights, the use of pregnancy as a
specific point of comparison dooms any equal protection claim to
failure, because men and women are inherently dissimilarly situated
with respect to the biological capacity to procreate. This biological
measure for sameness is too narrow, excluding the significance of
intended or unintended pregnancy in a person's life and the real life
contexts in which the abortion decision arises .2  Because pregnan-
cy is more than a biological issue, and abortion is more than a
medical one,"° the first step in thinking of abortion as an equal
protection issue is to reject the notion that the biological facts of
pregnancy are conclusive of legal results. This means rejecting the
view of the pre-Casey abortion cases in which women were considered,
if at all, as no more than patients."' °
It is necessary to recognize that reproductive rights have broader
significance-at least now and at least in this society-because of what
they can do for women and what their absence does to women.
Because of the profound effects of pregnancy on a woman's body and
the responsibilities entailed in raising children, reproductive rights,
perhaps more than anything else, define the degree to which women
can control the course of their lives.30 2  It is in this sense that
299. This highlights one of the flaws of characterizing pregnancy as unique. See General
Elec. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125,132 n.11 (1976) (discussing lower court's statement thatpregnancy
is unique disability which affects only members of female sex); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484,
497 (1974) (explaining uniqueness of disability). Referring to pregnancy as "unique" focuses
on the biological difference between men and women, using men as the benchmark and
identifying women's experience as a deviation from the norm. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 159.60.
Focusing on the particular-pregnancy-ignores the broader and more important fact that both
men and women have children. Even keeping to the particulars of pregnancy, this focus
completely ignores the fact that billions of people throughout history have experienced it and
continue to do so every year, and that many do it repeatedly throughout their lifetimes. It is
curious, therefore, to call this most common and necessary of conditions unique. It is only
unique because it does not describe the common experience of males.
300. See MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 83, at 189 (explaining impact
of pregnancy on women's lives).
301. See supra notes 248-49 and accompanying text.
302. Kay, supra note 297, at 23 n.125. The draft action plan of the 1994 United Nations
Conference on Population and Development illustrates this on a global scale, linking "women's
freedom of choice in reproduction, protection from abuse and empowerment through
education and other means." Crossette, supra note 7, at A3. This theme was reiterated at the
United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing at which Hilary Rodham
Clinton said that "It is a violation of human rights when women are denied the right to plan
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reproductive rights must be addressed for the purposes of an equal
protection claim and that Casey can be considered an important
precedent for future equal protection arguments.3
In three dimensions at once, the Court in Casey advanced this goal.
First, it recognized that what is at stake is a potentially broad and
embracing liberty right, and not an isolating privacy right. 4 As
applied to the equal protection analysis, this recognition suggests a
baseline for comparison that is more encompassing than biological
pregnancy but that extends to those "attributes of personhood" that
Casey found essential.3 5 The relevant elements in determining
whether women and men are similarly situated should be whether
members of both sexes are equally able "to organize[] intimate
relationships and ma[k] e choices that define their views of themselves
and their places in society ... [and] to participate equally in the
economic and social life of the Nation."0 6 If these rights are so
important as to implicate the constitutional right to liberty, they must
be available to women and men on an equal basis.
Second, the Court addressed a broader spectrum of people. In
prior cases, the women implicated in the abortion issue were
inevitably people with whom the Court could not or did not want to
relate: patients (as opposed to physicians), wives who perhaps
unreasonably would end their pregnancies (as opposed to husbands
who would further family values), young girls who were too immature
to know what was in their best interest (as opposed to responsible
parents or judges), or poor women dependent on public largess
their own families." Uli Schmetzer, First Lady Scolds China an Rights, CI. TRIB., Sept. 6, 1995,
at 1. The conference formally adopted a plan of action that "strongly affirmed women's sexual
rights." Rone Tempest & Maggie Farley, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1995, at Al. Although economic
opportunities and protection from violence are distinct issues and critical in their own right,
they are clearly connected to issues of reproductive health and freedom. Protection of one right
is less meaningful without the companionship of other rights. As Professor Catharine
MacKinnon points out, connecting the right to abortion with control over the body:
has been appealing for the same reasons it is inadequate: socially, women's bodies
have not been theirs; women have not controlled their meanings and their destinies.
Feminists have tried to assert that control without risking pursuit of the idea that
something more than women's bodies might be at stake, something closer to a net of
relations in which women are gendered and unequal.
MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 83, at 189; see also Law, supra note 3, at
1016-19 (describing some ways in which unwanted pregnancies burden women's lives). Law
concludes that "[c]ontrol over reproduction is the sine qua non of women's capacity to live as
equal people." Id. at 1028.
303. See Strauss, supra note 21, at 3 (suggesting that Casey began to recognize both centrality
of social status of women and issue of moral status of fetuses).
304. See supra notes 209-33 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's emphasis
on liberty as distinct from privacy).
305. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807.
306. I. at 2809.
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(rather than deference-owed legislatures). In Casey, the Court shifted
its focus away from these women and gave its attention instead to
adults whom the Court could understand and respect: people who
seek to participate in the public life of the nation, people who
become pregnant despite responsible efforts to avoid it-in short, all
people who wish and deserve to be treated as equals in society."0 7
Only when the Court focuses on people it identifies with and respects,
can the equality principle apply because only then is everyone situated
similarly. Furthermore, the recognition that abortion restrictions
affect all women militates against the legalistic dichotomies that have,
in the past, precluded equal protection analysis on the ground that
heightened scrutiny does not apply to subgroups of women such as
"women seeking abortions" or "pregnant women.""'8
Third, the Court recognized that abortion relates to profound and
far-reaching aspects of peoples' lives that affect both men and women.
Although both men and women do not get pregnant, both may want
to have children at a particular time in their lives and may want to
control their destinies, participate in public life, and live by their own
spiritual imperatives." This broader perspective is less artificial and
less restrictive than the narrow and simplistic standard which focused
only on the biological capacity to bear children thereby rendering any
equal protection analysis irrelevant.310
307. Id.
308. This polarization was evidenced in such cases as Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health
Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 761 n.4 (1993) (finding that relevant category is not women generally but
.women seeking abortions"); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322-24 (1980) (adopting language
of Maher); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470-71 (1977) (identifying relevant class as indigent
women desiring abortions); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 135 (1976) (adopting
language of Gedu/dig); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 n.20 (1974) (permitting insurance
program to classify people as pregnant-women or nonpregnant persons).
309. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2830-31 (discussing how women are affected by pregnancy). As
an empirical matter, it could turn out that, statistically, not all women want control over their
lives in the same way or to the same degree as men do. The Equal Protection Clause and the
equality principle it stands for, however, require the judicial presumption that both men and
women have these goals to the same extent. Any other presumption would throw the Court
back to a time when it constitutionalized cultural biases tojustify state action that perpetuated
separate roles for men and women. Compare Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961) (finding
that voluntary jury service for women was "based on some reasonable classification" because
"wom[e]n [are] still regarded as the center of home and family life") andMuller v. Oregon, 208
U.S. 412, 416-17, 423 (1908) (upholding maximum hours legislation for women in certain
professions on the ground that women need legislative protections) withJ.E.B. v. Alabama ex reL
T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1422 (1994) (proscribing gender-based peremptory challenges because
"the discrimination serves to ratify and perpetuate invidious, archaic, and overbroad stereotypes
about the relative abilities of men and women") and International Union, United Auto.,
Aerospace &Agric. Implement Workers v.Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 197 (1991) (holding
that fertile women, like fertile men, must be "given a choice as to whether they wish to risk their
reproductive health for a particularjob").
310. See Kay, supra note 297, at 22-23 (stating that "[a] woman may be distinguished from
a man by her capacity for pregnancy, childbirth, and lactation; but she may choose never to
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Casey's placement of reproductive rights in a broader context seems
squarely to reject earlier holdings that pregnancy-related burdens did
not constitute gender discrimination. These holdings were exempli-
fied by the glib assertion in Geduldig v. Aiello3n that a health insur-
ance plan that excludes pregnancy does not discriminate against
women because "[t ] here is no risk from which men are protected and
women are not. Likewise, there is no risk from which women are
protected and men are not" 312 By contrast, the approach in Casey
might reveal that the risk of not being able to participate simulta-
neously in the social and economic life of the nation and have a
biological family is a cognizable risk from which the Geduldig and
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert313 plans improperly protected men but
not women.314
By considering factors that are constitutionally significant to
women's lives, Casey indicated the "appropriate perspective from
which to decide whether groups or individuals are similarly situat-
ed."31 The notion of equality envisioned in Casey does not "assume
that it is possible [or even desirable] to ignore an individual's sex" or
her childbearing capacity.316 Rather, Casey equality acknowledges
gender differences and, through them, constructs a broader under-
standing of how the system harms women. Casey equality, therefore,
avoids the unnecessary schism between formal equality and special
treatment by recognizing that men and women have different
reproductive capacities but similar life goals. It makes terms such as
formal equality and special treatment irrelevant by focusing on
whether women's opportunities for self-expression or self-fulfillment,
utilize that capacity. Is she any less female? ... In our society salient distinctions are based on
sexuality rather than reproductive behavior").
311. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
312. Geduldig v. Aielo, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974). The Court said, "While it is true that
only women can become pregnant, it does not follow that every legislative classification
concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification." Id. at 496 n.20; see also Gilbert; 429 U.S. at
138 (quoting Geduldig language in text). Unfortunately, this thinking was also revived in the
post-Casey decision of Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 760-61, which again rejected the argument that
restrictions on "voluntary abortions" are gender-based. In that case, the issue was whether
obstruction of access to health clinics constituted gender-based discrimination for the purposes
of maintaining an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Id. at 758; see also Preterm Cleveland v.
Voinovich, 627 N.E.2d 570,581 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (adopting Geduldiglanguage cited above).
313. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
314. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 139 n.17 (maintaining that providing fringe benefits for women
who get pregnant would be unfair to men).
315. Mary E. Becker, Prince Charming. Abstract Formal Equality, 1987 SuP. Cr. REv. 201, 207
(arguing that formal equality did not provide such standards and was, therefore, apt to hurt
women more than it helped them).
316. Id. at 209. "We cannot so easily imagine a world in which women and men are equal
or in which sex would matter no more than eye color. Most of us would not want to live in a
world in which sex was no more important or relevant than eye color." Id. at 234.
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whether chosen through childbearing, professional exertion or
something else, are equivalent to men's. Because the ultimate goal
is equality, formal and otherwise, Casey equality implicitly incorporates
special treatment to the extent necessary to attain equivalent
opportunities.1i  Moreover, Casey equality eliminates the false
choice between accommodating and ignoring gender differences.3 18
It recognizes gender differences without using those differences to
disadvantage women. Finally, Casey equality assumes that the genders
must be equivalent to each other, rather than assuming that one
gender, presumably the male, sets the standard to which the other is
to be compared.31 9
The vision of equality suggested by Casey focuses on equivalency but
does not require that the two categories being compared be identi-
cal.32' Because both men and women have an equal right to define
their lives but may choose to do so differently, the equal protection
mandate requires that similarly situated people-meaning all people
who want to control their reproduction-be treated the same-that
is, be afforded the same opportunity to do so. A regulation that
impinges on one gender's ability to control their lives burdens people
unequally on the basis of gender. In this sense, equal means
equivalent, not identical, making women's and men's situations
commensurable and therefore subject to meaningful equal protection
scrutiny.
The idea of equivalency, rather than sameness, is parallel to the
increasingly common acceptance in tort law of perspectives other than
those of the reasonable man.32' Some courts, including the United
States Supreme Court, have recognized that in certain contexts, where
men and women are likely to respond differently to a situation, it is
necessary to acknowledge that the male perspective is not universal
317. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2707-08 (focusing on impact of pregnancy on women's lives and
giving women's life choices same respect as men's).
318. See Littleton, supra note 220, at 1313-14 (discussing how using accommodation to take
account of differences "accepts the prevailing norm as generally legitimate").
319. See MAcKiNNON, TowARD A FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 83, at 225 (criticizing
Aristotelian notion of treating likes same because it requires women to show that they are like
men in order to be entitled to equal treatment).
320. The focus on equivalency, rather than identicality, takes advantage of a concept that
Dean Kay has termed "equality of opportunity." Kay, supra note 297, at 26. Equality of
opportunity "offers a theoretical basis for making unequals [men and women] equal in the
limited sense of removing barriers which prevent individuals from performing according to their
abilities." I
321. Cf. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 32, at 173-75(5th ed. 1984) (describing "reasonable person" as "the 'reasonable man of ordinary prudence'
and stating that "[s]ometimes he is described as a reasonable person"); see infra note 325.
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and, insofar as the people principally affected are female, may not
even be relevant for measuring harm.322
In the context of sexual harassment, for instance, the relevant
perspective is increasingly that of the victim. The old assumption that
the male perspective was applicable to women often precluded women
from recovering when the alleged behavior was offensive to the
reasonable female, but not to the reasonable male. 23 For instance,
if the tort of sexual harassment is merely defined as the right to work
without being propositioned and it is measured from the male
perspective, women do not benefit because men are not generally.
injured by the kinds of propositioning that injure women.3 4 In this
regard, women and men are not similarly situated.
Recognizing this problem, some courts have measured unlawful
harassment by reference to the perspective of the reasonable woman
or the reasonable person in the victim's situation.3" Courts that
have accepted multiple perspectives have stepped just far enough back
from the traditional and narrow reasonable man standard to increase
their field of vision and permit the inclusion of women's view-
points. 26 In stepping back, these courts have redefined the sexual
harassment tort to redress harms to both women and men. In these
courts, the protected right is not simply the right to work free of
propositioning, but the broader right to work in an environment that
322. Harris v. Forklift Sys., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993) (holding that plaintiff's subjective
perceptions are relevant to determining whether allegedly offensive conduct violates Title VII).
323. See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Wor*place Norms, 42
VAND. L. REv. 1183, 1206 (1989) (arguing that "courts must employ a standard that reflects
women's perceptions of sexual harassment" because men and women experience sexual conduct
in workplace differently); Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of
Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1207-08 (1990) (explaining that men
tend to view some forms of sexual harassment as "harmless social interactions to which only
overly-sensitive women would object").
324. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 n.9 (9th Cir. 1991) (discussing how women and
men react differently to sexual advances).
325. See id. at 878 (adopting reasonable victim standard). The Ninth Circuit adopted this
standard because "[i] fwe only examined whether a reasonable person would engage in allegedly
harassing conduct, we would run the risk of reinforcing the prevailing level of discrimination.
Harassers could continue to harass merely because a particular discriminatory practice was
common, and victims of harassment would have no remedy." Id. The Ninth Circuit cited the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission complaint manual in support of its findings. Id.
at 878 (citing EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 615, 1 31120, at 3242 (1988) (stating that courts
"should consider the victim's perspective and not stereotyped notions of acceptable behavior")).
Several other courts have also adopted this standard. See, e.g., Kingv. Board of Regents of Univ.
of Wis. Sys., 898 F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990) (looking to perspective of plaintiff when
adjudicating harassment case); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d Cir.
1990) (acknowledging that men may consider actions that injure women to be harmless and
innocent); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987) (applying reasonable female
standard in case where victim was female).
326. See Brady, 924 F.2d at 878 (taking into consideration different viewpoints in
understanding victim's perspective).
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is not hostile or abusive."s Here, women and men are similarly
situated, and even if men and women differently define the content
of the right, both have an equivalent right.12' Thus, the equality
principle can acknowledge gender differences without demanding
that women be like men.
Like the equivalency measure in tort law, applying this standard to
abortion law would require a court to incorporate women's lives as
well as men's into its calculus. A court would also have to recognize
that what is at stake is not the narrow right to abortion, but the
broader right to liberty, autonomy, and control over one's life. By
injecting into its abortion jurisprudence the importance of autonomy
over the course of one's life, Casey paved the way for a constructive
application of equal protection jurisprudence to abortion cases. 29
Unfortunately, the Court did not follow through to see where this
new understanding would lead.
B. Integrating the Undue Burden Test
For more than twenty years, abortion has been considered part of
the fundamental right of privacy and protected as a liberty interest
under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. 3' This means that the Court has purported to strictly
scrutinize regulations interfering with the exercise of that privacy right
which, in turn, strongly suggested a finding of unconstitutionality.3 3'
While strict scrutiny reigned at least nominally, urging the Court to
apply equal protection law would be counterproductive for advocates
of legalized abortion: under equal protection, the Court is most likely
to apply the intermediate level of scrutiny it has used in gender
discrimination cases, which imposes a lesser burden on the Govern-
327. See id. at 879-80 (discussing right to work). The Court noted:
[A] gender-conscious examination of sexual harassment enables women to participate
in the workplace on an equal footing with men. By acknowledging and not trivializing
the effects of sexual harassment on reasonable women, courts can work towards
ensuring that neither men nor women will have to "run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in
return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living."
Id (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982)).
328. Id.
329. Strauss, supra note 21, at 18-20. Professor Strauss has argued that some abortion
regulations are inherently suspect because of society's tradition of undervaluing the interests of
women and their bodily integrity, as well as of stereotyping women "as people whose principal
responsibility is child bearing and child rearing." 1L at 19-20. This tradition, Strauss argues,
warrants heightened judicial scrutiny because it effectively disqualifies the government from
mandating women's reproductive rights. I
330. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); see also supra note 2.
331. Casey, 112 S. Ct at 2817 (stating that cases subsequent to Roe "decided that any
regulation touching upon the abortion decision must survive strict scrutiny, to be sustained only
if drawn on narrow terms to further a compelling state interest").
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ment to justify the classification. 32 The Court is therefore more
likely to uphold regulations reviewed under this more deferential
standard.
Even before Casey, however, it was clear that the Court was applying,
at best, a diluted brand of strict scrutiny to most abortion regulations.
In H.L. v. Matheson, the Court did not require Utah to use the least
restrictive alternative but, mixing doctrinal metaphors, held that the
statute "was narrowly drawn" to achieve its "important considerations
of family integrity and protection of adolescents."33  In Harris v.
McRae,3" the Hyde Amendment was upheld under the most defer-
ential standard because it was "rationally related to the legitimate
governmental objective of protecting potential life," even though the
effect was to preclude completely some women from obtaining the
abortions they needed."s Most significantly, in the most prominent
abortion case prior to Casey, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,3 6
a plurality of the Court applied a simple rational basis standard to
abortion restrictions.337
One reason for the Court's reluctance to use strict scrutiny, despite
its lip service to fundamental rights, may be the now-you-see-it-(Roe)-
now-you-don't-(Bowers)3  nature of the privacy right. 39 By locat-
332. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (requiring government to prove that
distinction drawn between males and females was substantially related to important govern-
mental purpose).
333. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411 (1981) (footnotes omitted). The first part of the
standard borrows language from the strict scrutiny test, while the second part requires the
government to meet only the intermediate scrutiny standard.
334. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
335. Id. at 325. Ignoring the effect, the court treated the Amendment as a funding decision
well within legislative discretion.
336. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
337. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 520 (1989). See generally Golker,
An Equal Protection Analysis supra note 149, at 356-57 (discussing the Court's application of
legitimate interest standard to abortion restrictions).
338. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
339. CompareRoe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding that right to privacy is broad enough
to encompass decision to terminate pregnancy) with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)
(finding that no constitutional right to privacy precludes Georgia from criminalizingsex between
consenting homosexual adults). It is difficult to reconcile Bowerswith the Court's long tradition
of cases protecting rights relating to sex, procreation, and intimate associations despite the
Court's effort to do so. See e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (recognizing right to
have abortions); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-55 (1972) (holding that unmarried
individuals have right to use contraception); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967)
(recognizing right to interracial marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965)
(holding that married individuals have right to use contraception); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541-43 (1942) (protecting right of convicted felons against forced sterilization); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (holding that parents may have children learn foreign
language). The Court in Bowers characterized the case as concerning the "fundamental right
to engage in homosexual sodomy," that could not be found in the Constitution, and
distinguished earlier cases as protecting rights relating to "family, marriage, or procreation."
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191. The Court might have chosen a broader level of generality and found
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ing the right to make an abortion decision directly in the liberty right
of the Due Process Clauses, without detouring through privacy
jurisprudence, Casey arguably reinforced the applicability of strict
scrutiny to regulations impinging on the exercise of a textually
explicit fundamental right.' 0 Regardless of terminology, however,
consistency between dictum and holding would require that the same
Justices who extol reproductive rights in Parts II and III of Casey, 41
apply strict scrutiny to restrictions on such rights in Part V.12
In Casey, however, the Court officially adopted the undue burden
test, which invalidates a regulation that "has the purpose or effect of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion of a non-viable fetus."s' 3  This is not akin to the strict
scrutiny test or to the rational basis test."4  What the undue
Hardwick's claim to be consistent with the precedents noted above by characterizing them all
as protecting against state interference with individuals' rights to organize their intimate
relationships. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTrONAL LAW, supra note 228, at 1427-28.
340. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804-07. This analysis, however, could alternatively lead to the
opposite conclusion: strict scrutiny applies so long as something is considered part of a
fundamental right to privacy (such as the use of contraceptives), but mere liberties (such as
economic or non-procreative sexual liberties) may be analyzed under rational basis. SeeTRIDE,
AMERICAN CONSTrrUIONAL LAW, supra note 228, at 1306-08 (describing standards for
fundamental rights). ChiefJustice Rehnquist's separate opinion in Casey offers some support
for this view: "A woman's interest in having an abortion is a form of liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause, but States may regulate abortion procedures in ways rationally related to
a legitimate state interest." 112 S. Ct. at 2867. Alternatively, the analysis could be completely
result-oriented. If the Court decides that a particular right (e.g., non-procreative sex) can be
properly regulated, it will find that the right is not included in the constitutional right to privacy.
See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190 (characterizing right at issue on most specific level and therefore
finding no constitutional support for protection against infringement in right to privacy).
Characterizing the right as liberty, as opposed to privacy, therefore, is not conclusive, but it does
permit the Court to focus on the more essential question of whether the right is so important
as to be fundamental instead of determining, first, if the right is a concomitant of privacy and,
second, the scope of the privacy interest.
341. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804, 2808; see also supra note 207 (discussing structure of court's
opinion).
342. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2821.
343. Id. at 2820.
344. ChiefJustice Rehnquist complained that "Roe decided that abortion regulations were
to be subjected to 'strict scrutiny' and could be justified only in the light of 'compelling state
interests.' The joint opinion rejects that view." Id. at 2860 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). But see id. at 2845-46 (BIackmun,J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Justice Blackmun stated that "[t]oday, no less than yesterday, the Constitution and
decisions of this Court require that a State's abortion restrictions be subjected to the strictest
ofjudicial scrutiny .... Our precedents and thejoint opinion's principles require us to subject
all non-de minimis abortion regulations to strict scrutiny." Id. It is not clear whether Justice
Blackmun spoke descriptively or normatively.
345. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2806-07 (distinguishing Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S.
483, 487 (1955) (stating that legislature has discretion to balance advantages and disadvantages
of economic legislation) and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963) (settling that Due
Process Clause does not require Court to apply heightened scrutiny to economic regulations)).
The undue burden test is distinguishable from strict scrutiny and rational basis, as well as from
intermediate scrutiny in that it does not permit the government tojustify the regulation: even
the most compelling purpose will not save a law if it is found to impose an undue burden. Id.
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burden test is akin to is unclear. The Court's application of the test
to the Pennsylvania laws failed to indicate how it or lower courts will
or should apply the test in the future, except to suggest that the test
does not have much bite.' In addition, the Court did not explain
how it could abandon strict scrutiny while emphatically reaffirming "a
constitutional liberty of the woman to have some freedom to
terminate her pregnancy."' 4  Thus, the undue burden test repre-
sents an amorphous middle tier in the due process context; it seems
to apply even when the right being impinged is admittedly fundamen-
tal, and despite Casey's admonition that "[l]iberty must not be extin-
guished for want of a line that is clear."' It is therefore doubtful
that, even if the Court were to apply equal protection analysis, it
would adopt anything more rigorous or predictive than intermediate
scrutiny, the amorphous middle tier of equal protection law. Thus,
a shift to equal protection analysis would not necessarily increase the
accessibility of safe abortion services for women in need any more
than the present due process analysis. 49
There is no need, however, to choose between due process and
equal protection analyses because abortion restrictions implicate both.
Any legislation that infringes on the liberty of a discrete segment of
the population is susceptible to challenge on both grounds. For
instance, where a law limits whom members of one group can marry,
the limitation discriminates by not applying to all people equally and
violates due process by impermissibly regulating a decision about
at 2820.
346. I& at 2819-22.
347. I. at 2816.
348. Id. The Court was obviously aware of the amorphous nature of the undue burden test
and presumably chose it for its flexibility despite the vehement criticism of fourJusices. Id. at
2876-80. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas called it "an
unjustified constitutional compromise," 112 S. Ct. at 2855-56, while Justice Scalia described the
test as "inherently manipulable" and predicted it would "prove hopelessly unworkable in
practice." Id. at 2877; see also Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d 1335, 1336 (5th Cir.) (stating that
"[d]espite the recent efforts of a three-justice plurality of the Supreme Court, passing on the
constitutionality of state statutes regulating abortion after Casey has become neither less difficult
nor more closely anchored to the Constitution"), cert. denie, 114 S. Ct. 468 (1993). In Casey,
Justice Scalia also noted that the test is intrinsically illogical since "[a]ny regulation of abortion
that is intended to advance what the joint opinion concedes is the State's 'substantial' interest
in protecting unborn life will be 'calculated [to] hinder' a decision to have an abortion," and
thus violate the undue burden test. 112 S. Ct. at 2877. Despite this logical criticism, most of
the statutes in Casey were found to pass the test.
349. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804-08. To the extent that the rational basis standard garnered
more votes in Casey than either strict scrutiny or the undue burden test and was one vote away
from a majority and to the extent that the court's commitment to intermediate scrutiny for
gender discrimination is on more solid ground, a switch toward an equal protection analysis
would ensure a higher level of scrutiny than rational basis.
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marriage."' In Skinner v. Oklahoma,"5' the Court invalidated, on
equal protection grounds, the sterilization of thrice-convicted felons,
although Chief Justice Stone would have invalidated the law as a
deprivation of personal liberty."5 2 In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court
found no due process violation in a Georgia statute regulating
consensual but non-procreative sex, 3 but failed to consider wheth-
er the application of the statute only to homosexual men constituted
an equal protection violation.s54
In all of these examples, the state discriminated against a politically
powerless group by invading the members' liberty interests. Abortion
restrictions are similar. Indeed, Casey professed a dual commitment
to reproductive rights as a concomitant of liberty and of women's
roles and opportunities in society today. Because abortion implicates
both these issues, laws restricting access to abortion must pass both
due process and equal protection tests. Initially, the Court should ask
whether a provision constitutes an undue burden. If it does, it should
be struck down. 55 If it does not, the Court should then ask wheth-
er the burden, even if not undue, is borne more heavily by women
than by men. If so, does the unequal burden substantially further an
important state interest?3 56
For example, the Court in Casey upheld the informed consent
provision because it did not constitute an undue burden. 57 Under
350. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7-12 (1967) (applying equal protection analysis to
invalidate antimiscegination law).
351. 316 U.S. 535, 538 (1942).
352. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 544 (1942).
353. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
354. In many cases, it will not matter which constitutional provision the Court chooses, if
either would result in invalidation. Because of the different levels of scrutiny, however, the
selection could be determinative. For instance, a court could sustain a morality-based regulation
for any rational reason, but if it found homosexuals to constitute a quasi-suspect class, the court
could require the state to show it had an important reason for applying the regulation only to
homosexuals. Even where the levels of scrutiny are the same, what the court requires the
government to justify may differ, and that could change the result. Thus, even if no quasi-
suspect classification exists, a court may find that it is rational for a state to regulate morality,
but irrational for the state to apply its regulation only to homosexuals.
355. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2821.
356. This is merely an application of the general principle that all governmental action must
comport with all parts of the Constitution. The intermediate scrutiny test, as originally
conceived, recognized that equal protection and due process tests are not redundant and that
a provision that violates one is not made constitutionaljust because it does not violate the other.
In Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 199-200 (1976), for instance, the Court held that
Oklahoma's refusal to permit boys under 21 to buy low-alcohol beer did not violate due process,
though it did violate equal protection because the disparate treatment of underage boys and
girls furthered no important governmental interest. Id. at 197, 199-200. While it was clear that
Oklahoma could forbid anyone under the age of 21 from purchasing low-alcohol beer, it could
not forbid boys from purchasing beer while allowing girls to do so. ld. at 199.
357. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2822-24.
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this proposal, the Court would further ask if the burden created by
the informed consent provision-subjecting women, but not men, to
information intended to discourage the exercise of protected
reproductive rights-substantially furthered an important state
interest.'s A burden that is constitutional for due process purposes
may nonetheless be invalid if it injures women more than men for no
important reason. 59 Requiring the State to prove that abortion
regulations are not undue burdens and that they do not, without
important reasons, treat women differently than men would be
treated under equivalent circumstances is an appropriate burden for
the State to bear. Furthermore, as discussed above, the point of
reference should not be as specific as the particular question of access
to abortion because with respect to pregnancy women and men are
not similarly situated. The question must be conceived broadly
enough to reflect the true significance of the regulation on the
women subject to it and to encompass events that women and men
experience equivalently. Using Casey language, the question might be:
as a result of this law, are women less able than men to "organize []
their intimate relationships and ... define ... their place in
society?" "S° Does this regulation impede women's ability "to partici-
pate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation" or to
"control their reproductive lives" 61 to the same degree as men can?
Had the Court in Casey adopted an equal protection analysis, it
would have been able to deal more honestly with the husband
notification provision that it struck down. The Court invalidated the
notification requirement primarily on the ground that it unduly
burdened those women who would not otherwise tell their husbands
about the intended abortion. 2 Although it is true that the require-
ment would impose significant burdens on these women, the harm of
358. An alternative formulation might be: "Does the state require informed consent
designed to discourage election of medical procedures that pertain only to men or equally to
men and women?" See Schrager, supra note 15, at 1332 (discussing Case's informed consent and
waiting period and noting that no other medical procedure demands such delay).
359. See Colker, An Equal Protection Analysis, supra note 149, at 355-57 (embracing equal
protection analysis as more stringent than due process analysis).
360. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2809.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 2829-31. Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the plurality for focusing on these
women because the appropriate question in a facial challenge is whether any "set of
circumstances exists under which the [provision] would be valid." Id. at 2870 (Rehnquist, CJ.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted). Justice Blackmun in turn
criticized the ChiefJustice for failing to explain "how a battered woman is supposed to pursue
an as-applied challenge." Id. at 2854. To avoid this morass, the plurality could have rested its
holding on the fact that compelled communication is invalid under the First Amendment, see
supra notes 263-66 and accompanying text, or, more broadly, that the provision violates the
Equal Protection Clause, see supra notes 188-284 and accompanying text.
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the requirement is in its subordination of all married women to their
husbands in contravention, not of their liberty rights, but of their
equality rights. As noted above, the Court recognized this without
explicitly holding that the constitutional defect of the provision was
the violation of the Equal Protection Clause."
CONCLUSION: WHEN RHETORIC HAS A MEANING OF ITS OWN
When a case is as harmful to women in its multiple holdings as the
Casey decision is, it can legitimately be asked what justifies an article
such as this one which lauds the rhetoric of the case while
downplaying the holdings. At the very least, Casey provides substan-
tially less protection than was available under Roe. In addition, Casey
explicitly overruled some prior cases that had provided people with
a meaningful measure of protection against some of the more
burdensome abortion restrictions." Therefore, it is quite possible
that Casey's real legacy will be a collection of cases in lower and
higher courts that uphold increasingly restrictive abortion laws as not
imposing undue burdens. As noted above, this has already be-
gun. 5 After all, dictum is just dictum, but holdings are what courts
follow. Indeed, it could be argued that focusing on the lofty language
while ignoring the actual effects of the case simply reproduces the
very injustice that the Court itself is accused of committing."a The
objection recalls the following comment of Catharine MacKinnon
about the relationship between theory and practice:
It is common to say that something is good in theory but not in
practice. I always want to say, then it is not such a good theory, is
it? To be good in theory but not in practice posits a relation
between theory and practice that places theory prior to practice,
both methodologically and normatively, as if theory is a terrain
unto itself. 7
363. See supra notes 260-94 and accompanying text (discussing Court's attention to equality
issues).
364. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2823 (overruling Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S.
416 (1983) (Akron I), and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747 (1986) to extent that cases invalidated "the giving of truthful, nonmisleading
information about the nature of [abortion], the attendant health risks and those of childbirth,
and the 'probable gestational age' of the fetus").
365. See supra note 22 (identifying lower court cases applying undue burden standard to
abortion restrictions). As those cases demonstrate, several states have already amended their
laws to conform to the provisions upheld in Casey.
366. See supra Part II (demonstrating how Court repeatedly ignores persons most affected by
pregnancy); see, e.g., Schrager, supra note 15, at 1332 (commenting on implication of Casey
opinion); West, supra note 15, at 962 (criticizing Casey decision).
367. Catharine A. Macinnon, From Practice to Theory, Or What is a White Woman, Anyway?, 4
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13, 13 (1991) (quoted in COLKER, supra note 3, at xi).
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In other words, what good is good rhetoric if it couches harmful
holdings?
Two answers to this question present themselves, one instrumental
and the other intrinsic. The first speaks generally to the nature of
reconstructive projects. Reconstructive efforts spring from events that
compel them, not events that are already fully constructed. They are
only relevant when the defects but not the benefits of the thing are
evident." Thus, a principal purpose of this effort is to show how,
despite the evident harm caused by Casey, this case may contain the
seeds for a jurisprudence more consistent with and more responsive
to people's needs for secure reproductive rights. In this context,
Casey is important because it represents a new willingness by the
Supreme Court to acknowledge realistically the effects of unintended
pregnancies on women's lives, and to recognize that abortion laws
affect all women including those not currently pregnant and those
whose pregnancies resulted despite diligent attempts to avoid
pregnancy. Furthermore, the Court seems to recognize that because
abortion laws affect women significantly more than men, such laws
implicate the constitutional right to equal protection on the basis of
gender. Given how rare victories are, litigants should seize whatever
opportunities the Court presents. They should use to their advantage
whatever progressive language the Court provides, even when such
language is obscured by regressive holdings.
The intrinsic response focuses on the independent harm caused by
the language of the earlier abortion cases from which Casey, to some
meaningful extent, departs. Language, perhaps unlike theory, is a
terrain unto itself, and the language the Court uses to talk about
litigants is significant because it reveals something about how the
government views its constituents. 69
When the Court speaks only from the perspective of doctors,
fathers, and husbands, it minimizes the importance of other points of
view; its condescension towards those who voice other arguments
pervades its opinions. The Court's lack of respect for women was not
only insulting, but it prevented the Court from even considering the
relevance of equal protection arguments to abortion. Thus, the
Court's rhetoric produces benefits and harms independent of the
actual holdings. Its dependence on the Roe rhetoric in subsequent
368. The historical period called Reconstruction, of course, occurred after the Civil War, not
after a time of peace and prosperity. THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 2288 (5th ed. 1993).
369. See Law, supra note 3, at 969-87. "[C]onstitutional concepts of equality are important
both because of their concrete impact on legislative power and individual right and because
constitutional ideas reflect and shape culture." Id. at 956-57.
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cases, for example, perpetuated and reinforced the view that abortion
is a medical decision that implicates doctors' rights first and women's
rights a distant second. Although the holding in Roe pleased many
feminists, the Court's stunted understanding of women's lives and the
effects of abortion laws on women's lives limited the effective impact
of the decision. Roe's rhetorical framework could not reach the
restrictions that subsequently came under the Court's scrutiny. Thus,
a court wishing to shift from Rods doctor-oriented privacy rationale to
an equal protection analysis would have to abandon the Roe perspec-
tive and adopt a view of women that fully recognizes their
personhood. The 1970s view of women will no longer work.
Although Casey does not fulfill the promise of its rhetoric, it does
at least create a promise, and one that has substantially more
potential than what was possible with the outmoded view of women
manifested in the earlier cases. When the Court does revisit the
abortion issue, it should remember that abortion implicates both
equal protection and liberty interests, and integrate both lines of
analysis, taking into account its updated view of women that is new to
abortion jurisprudence, and entirely welcome.
